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CHILD WITNESSES AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
THOMAS D. LYON & JULIA A. DENTE *
After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford v. Washington that a
criminal defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him is violated
by the admission of testimonial hearsay that has not been cross-examined,
lower courts have overturned convictions in which hearsay from children
was admitted after child witnesses were either unwilling or unable to
testify. A review of social scientific evidence regarding the dynamics of
child sexual abuse suggests a means for facilitating the fair receipt of
children’s evidence. Courts should hold that defendants have forfeited their
confrontation rights if they exploited a child’s vulnerabilities such that they
could reasonably anticipate that the child would be unavailable to testify.
Exploitation includes choosing victims on the basis of their filial
dependency, their vulnerability, or their immaturity, as well as taking
actions that create or accentuate those vulnerabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
1

In State v. Waddell, a seven-year-old child named J.M.J. disclosed
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No. 92,378, 2006 WL 1379576 (Kan. Ct. App. May 19, 2006).
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sexual abuse to a social services investigator in a videotaped interview. 2 In
the interview, J.M.J. described “sexual intercourse, anal sex, the touching of
her breast, and touching of [defendant’s] penis.” 3 Waddell was J.M.J.’s
next-door neighbor. J.M.J. would visit Waddell to watch T.V., to use his
bathroom, and to play with his puppies. 4 She would also visit his daughter
and granddaughter when they were in his home. 5 J.M.J. also revealed the
abuse to her grandmother, a teacher, a nurse, a day-care provider, and a
therapist. 6 She explained that she had not immediately disclosed the abuse
because she wanted to continue playing with Waddell’s puppies and
because Waddell had threatened her with a knife that she should not tell.7
At trial, J.M.J. refused to testify. Her videotaped interview was admitted
into evidence.
At trial it was also revealed that Waddell had previously abused his
own daughter. She testified to eleven years of sexual abuse and recalled
Waddell’s warning that “she would be sent to an orphanage if she told their
secret.” 8 She also testified that Waddell had taken naked pictures of her
when she was a child. 9 Waddell admitted abusing his daughter, but
emphasized that it was “nonforcible.” 10 He also admitted taking naked
pictures, but asserted that she was seventeen and that she had “volunteered
to be a photography model.” 11 A picture of a naked young girl was found
in the defendant’s bedroom, 12 and J.M.J. reported that Waddell showed her
a picture of a naked child.13 Waddell denied abusing J.M.J.
The jury convicted Waddell, but his conviction was overturned
because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington.14 The
appellate court held that because J.M.J. refused to testify and because her
videotaped statement to a social services investigator constituted
testimonial hearsay, admitting the videotape violated the defendant’s
constitutional right to cross-examine J.M.J. 15 The fact that the trial court
had admitted the videotape only after assessing its reliability mattered
2

Id. at *1–3.
Id. at *2.
4
Id. at *1, *4.
5
Id. at *9.
6
Id. at *1–3.
7
Id.
8
Id. at *3.
9
Id. at *4.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at *3.
13
Id. at *2.
14
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
15
Waddell, 2006 WL 1379576, at *9.
3
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naught, 16 because Crawford emphasized that a defendant’s Confrontation
Clause right to confront witnesses was a procedural right, rendering the
reliability of the videotape irrelevant. Because the videotaped interview
was central to the state’s case, the error could not be considered harmless
and the conviction was overturned. 17
Waddell is one of many cases around the country in which criminal
convictions have been overturned because children’s out-of-court
statements were admitted after they failed to testify. 18 These cases include
allegations of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and domestic violence, the
types of cases in which child witnesses are most often called to testify. 19
Typically, children’s statements were admitted after the trial courts found
the children unavailable to testify and assessed the statements’ reliability
under special hearsay exceptions for children’s complaints. Most states
have such exceptions, which were promulgated to address the difficulties of
proving child abuse while remaining mindful of the need for individualized
assessments of the trustworthiness of children’s reports. 20
Crawford radically altered the treatment of hearsay under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 21 In Crawford, the Court
held that a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights are violated by the
admission of testimonial hearsay that has not been cross-examined.
“Testimonial hearsay” includes statements “in which state actors are
involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain
evidence for trial.” 22 Unless an emergency exists, many if not most
statements to government officials are likely to be considered testimonial.
Statements made to social workers and the police when they interview
children during investigations of alleged child abuse and domestic violence
are usually deemed testimonial. Testimonial hearsay also includes most
statements made to agents of the police.
In many cases involving child witnesses, children are interviewed at
child advocacy centers by specially trained forensic interviewers who work

16

Id.
Id. at *9.
18
See infra notes 53–74, 285–302 and accompanying text.
19
See Gail S. Goodman et al., Innovations for Child Witnesses: A National Survey, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L., 255, 264–65 (1999) [hereinafter Innovations for Child
Witnesses].
20
See NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
OF CHILD ABUSE 369–70 (3d ed. 2004).
21
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
22
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).
17
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closely with social services and the police.23 In Waddell, a social worker
interviewed the child at a child advocacy center while a police detective
operated the video camera. The worker took several breaks, during which
she consulted with the detective, and when the interview was complete, she
forwarded the tape to law enforcement. 24 At the best child advocacy
centers, interview protocols are followed, the interviews are videotaped, and
both social services and the police observe the interviews in order to
minimize the need for multiple interviews. Because the interviews are
recorded, the exact words used by the interviewer and by the child can be
closely scrutinized for evidence of suggestion, confabulation, or
misinterpretation. Ironically, because of the formality and the input
provided by state actors, the statements are almost sure to be deemed
testimonial, triggering application of Crawford.25
One of the few exceptions to the rule announced in Crawford is the
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. In Giles v. California, 26 the state
sought to introduce against the defendant statements that the murder victim
previously made to the police. 27 The defendant successfully argued that his
confrontation rights were presumptively denied because he could not crossexamine the victim at trial. 28 However, Giles held that a defendant forfeits
his right to confront an unavailable hearsay declarant if the court finds that
he engaged in wrongdoing that was designed to and did in fact cause the
declarant’s unavailability. 29 A majority of the Court expressed the view
that repeated acts of domestic violence against the declarant should suffice
to prove that her murder was motivated by a desire to control the declarant
and render her unavailable.30 The opinion constitutes an unusual
willingness by the Court to consider the dynamics of a crime in assessing
the rights of criminal defendants.
The Giles opinion provides an opportunity to apply the forfeiture
23

Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual Abuse: Why
Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child Testimony, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 239,
252 (2010).
24
State v. Waddell, No. 92,378, 2006 WL 1379576, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. May 19, 2006).
25
See JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, CHILD
MALTREATMENT, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, RAPE, STALKING, AND ELDER ABUSE 874–76
(5th ed. 2012) (collecting cases).
26
554 U.S. 353 (2008).
27
Id. at 356.
28
Id. at 358–59.
29
We will routinely use the word “declarant” to refer to hearsay declarants. Because
most child witnesses are victims of child sexual abuse, and the perpetrators of child sexual
abuse tend to be males and the victims of child sexual abuse tend to be females, we will
routinely use “he” to refer to defendants and “she” to refer to declarants.
30
Giles, 554 U.S at 377.
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doctrine to the special challenges facing the prosecution in child-witness
cases. Assessing the dynamics of child sexual abuse, we will argue that
forfeiture should apply if the defendant exploited a child’s vulnerabilities
such that he could reasonably anticipate that the child would be unavailable
to testify. Exploitation includes choosing victims on the basis of their filial
dependency, their vulnerability, or their immaturity. Exploitation also
includes taking actions that create or accentuate those vulnerabilities.
Section II explores how Crawford altered the prosecution of child
abuse. Section III describes the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the
Confrontation Clause and discusses how a majority of the Court exhibited a
willingness to consider the dynamics of abuse in applying the forfeiture
doctrine. Section IV describes the dynamics of child sexual abuse and how
perpetrators exploit the foreseeable unavailability of their victims. Section
V demonstrates how the lower courts have missed the opportunity to apply
forfeiture to child-witness cases. Section VI concludes.
II. HOW CRAWFORD ALTERED THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE
Crawford v. Washington changed the status of hearsay evidence under
the Confrontation Clause. Prior to Crawford, such evidence was assessed
under Ohio v. Roberts, 31 which admitted hearsay statements from
unavailable declarants if they bore “indicia of reliability.”32 Reliability
could be assumed either if the statements fell within a “firmly-rooted
hearsay exception” or if they had “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.” 33 Many hearsay statements by children had to satisfy the
trustworthiness standard, because they were admitted under exceptions that
were not firmly rooted, such as the residual exception or special statutory
exceptions for children’s abuse complaints. Hence, in Idaho v. Wright, 34
the Court upheld the reversal of a sexual abuse conviction because
statements made by a two-and-a-half-year-old to a physician were admitted
under the “residual” exception to the hearsay rule and lacked guarantees of
trustworthiness. 35 The Court held that the Confrontation Clause required
31

448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Id. at 66.
33
Id. In Roberts and subsequent cases, the Court held that a number of hearsay
exceptions were firmly rooted, including public records, business records, dying
declarations, coconspirator statements, and of most relevance to child abuse cases, the
spontaneous utterances exception and the medical diagnosis exception. White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992) (statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and
spontaneous utterances); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (statements by
coconspirator); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8 (dying declarations, public records, business
records, and prior testimony).
34
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
35
Id. at 827. The residual exception was IDAHO R. EVID. 803(24) (allowing admission of
32
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exclusion of such statements “unless an affirmative reason, arising from the
circumstances in which the statement was made, provides a basis for
rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not worthy of reliance
at trial.” 36 The prosecution would have to prove that “the declarant’s
truthfulness [was] so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test
of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.” 37 Although the Court
rejected a procedural requirement that the statements be recorded,38 it
endorsed an assessment that is facilitated by recording: analysis of the
spontaneity, consistency, and age-appropriateness of the child’s
responses. 39
Crawford and its progeny overruled Roberts. 40 Crawford emphasized
that the Confrontation Clause was about procedure, rather than substance:
The defendant has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
Hence, the question is not whether the hearsay is true or false, but whether
the hearsay declarant could be called a “witness” or not and whether the
defendant had been given the right to confront the declarant.
To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
41
crucible of cross-examination.

The Court coined the term “testimonial hearsay,” 42 which, as the Court has
since clarified, is hearsay that has “a primary purpose of creating an out-ofcourt substitute for trial testimony.” 43 Crawford and subsequent cases have
held that testimonial hearsay includes most statements made to the police,44
other governmental officials, 45 or agents of the police,46 unless there is an
any “statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness”). This language appears in the
federal rules (FED. R. EVID. 807), as well as in the evidence rules of many states.
36
Wright, 497 U.S. at 821.
37
Id. at 820.
38
Id. at 818–19. The Idaho Supreme Court seriously weighed this option. Of course, in
future applications of the residual exception to child abuse statements, whether the
statements were videotaped would remain a valid factor in applying the statutory exception.
39
Id. at 821–22.
40
See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007) (Crawford overruled Roberts).
41
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
42
Id. at 53.
43
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct 1143, 1155 (2011); see also Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 823, 828, 830 (2006).
44
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (“Statements taken by police officers in the course of
interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.”).
45
Id. at 53 (“The involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial
evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are police or justices of the peace.”); id.
at 55 n.7 (“Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye

2012]

CHILD WITNESSES

1187

emergency 47 or the primary purpose of the interaction is something other
than pursuing prosecution. 48 If the testimonial declarant fails to testify, the
defendant is deprived of his right to confront a witness against him. In
short, Crawford held that admission of testimonial hearsay from a declarant
who cannot be cross-examined violates the Confrontation Clause.
Crawford abandoned any application of the Clause to nontestimonial
hearsay, and abandoned any attempt by the courts to analyze the reliability
of hearsay under the Clause. 49
It immediately became clear that Crawford would have a major effect
on the prosecution of crimes within the family and the home because of the
frequency with which family members fail to testify. Crawford itself
involved a case in which the defendant’s wife was the hearsay declarant and
failed to testify because the defendant claimed the spousal privilege. Davis
v. Washington, 50 in which the Court carved out an exigency exception to the
rule, involved two domestic violence cases: one in which a woman gave
statements to the police in her home while her husband was detained in
another room, and the other in which a woman called 911 to report her
boyfriend’s abuse as he was fleeing the home. 51 In Giles v. California, in
which the Court considered the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, the
defendant was charged with murdering his ex-girlfriend, and the challenged
hearsay involved her statements to a police officer complaining of an attack
after Giles accused her of having an affair. 52
A. FAILED PROSECUTIONS POST-CRAWFORD
In addition to the Waddell case described in the Introduction, the
toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and
again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”).
46
Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2 (“If 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement
officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of
911 callers.”).
47
Id. at 822 (“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”).
48
Id. (holding that hearsay is testimonial when “the primary purpose of the [police]
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution”).
49
See id. at 823 (holding that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial
hearsay); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of
hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements
from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”).
50
Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
51
Id. at 817–19.
52
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008).
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appellate reports are replete with cases in which application of Crawford
led to reversals of convictions in which children’s hearsay had been
admitted after the children failed to testify. These are typically cases in
which the child’s inability to testify was unexpected and in which other
evidence of guilt convinced the prosecutor to attempt to go forward without
the child’s testimony.
In State v. Pitt, 53 the four-year-old victim, while living with her mother
and the defendant, began to resist being alone with the defendant and
disclosed sexual abuse to her mother. 54 She made consistent statements to a
physician, a psychologist, and a forensic interviewer in a videotaped
interview. 55 The physician found physical evidence of abuse. 56 The child
also disclosed having seen the defendant sexually abuse the child’s fiveyear-old cousin, who herself confirmed abuse of both girls in a videotaped
interview. 57 The state presented both girls at trial, but they appeared too
upset and frightened to answer questions and were declared unavailable. 58
The videotaped interviews of both children were admitted, and the
conviction was reversed on appeal because the interviews were testimonial
hearsay. 59
In State v. Noah, 60 an eleven-year-old broke down during the
preliminary hearing. 61 Her hearsay was allowed under an exception
requiring reliability. 62 She had told her brother and mother that the
defendant, a “longtime family friend,”63 had touched her “private spot” and
recounted seven specific incidents of abuse occurring over several years to
a social worker and police.64 The Kansas Supreme Court upheld reversal of
the conviction on the ground that the statements to the social worker and the
police were testimonial hearsay. 65
In People v. Sharp, 66 a five-year-old was found to be unavailable
53
147 P.3d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d on reh’g, 159 P.3d 329 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
The case was retried, both girls testified, and the defendant was convicted. State v. Pitt, 237
P.3d 890 (Or. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 352 Or. 566 (2012).
54
Pitt, 147 P.3d at 942.
55
Id. at 942–43.
56
Id. at 942.
57
Id. at 942–43.
58
Id. at 943.
59
Id. at 945–46.
60
162 P.3d 799 (Kan. 2007).
61
Id. at 802.
62
Id. at 801.
63
Id. at 800.
64
Id. at 800–01.
65
Id. at 806.
66
155 P.3d 577 (Colo. App. 2006).
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because she was “too traumatized.” 67 The trial court admitted a videotaped
statement in which the child disclosed to a forensic interviewer her father’s
sexual abuse, which was consistent with what she previously had told her
mother. 68 The appellate court reversed the conviction because the statement
was testimonial hearsay. 69
In In re S.R., 70 a four-year-old was deemed unavailable after becoming
“hysterical” at trial, but her hearsay was admitted after the trial court
assessed its reliability. 71 The mother had heard the child say, “Do you want
me to do it to you?” during play, and the victim disclosed that the
defendant, her uncle, had digitally penetrated her anus. 72 The victim later
disclosed other details of abuse to a forensic interviewer. 73 The appellate
court reversed the conviction on the ground that the forensic interview was
testimonial hearsay. 74
In several of the aforementioned cases, the excluded statements were
videotaped interviews with the child. Hence, under Roberts, it was
particularly easy for a trial court to review the tape and assess the reliability
of the child’s statements. These cases provide the starkest examples of how
Crawford has changed the reception of a child’s statements when the child
fails to testify. The exact words spoken by the child and interviewer were
available, but because the child could not (or would not) testify in court, the
recorded statement could not be presented to the jury.
These cases represent just the tip of the iceberg, because Crawford has
changed the nature of the cases that prosecutors choose to pursue, rendering
its full effects invisible to readers of the appellate reports. Reversals of
cases in which child interviews were admitted into evidence are likely to
have deterred prosecutors in two respects. In cases in which the interview
provided the most compelling evidence of abuse, prosecutors will have
dropped charges or watered down charges in exchange for guilty pleas. In
cases in which there was other admissible hearsay, prosecutors will have
proceeded without introducing the interviews. Neither type of case would
have led to appellate assessment of whether these interviews were
testimonial.
In sum, Crawford has made it difficult to prosecute cases in which the
67

Id. at 578.
Id.
69
Id. at 581–83.
70
920 A.2d 1262 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), cert. granted, 941 A.2d 671 (Pa. 2007)
(regarding whether statements to mother were also testimonial).
71
In re S.R., 920 A.2d at 1264.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 1269.
68
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child witness initially reported the crime to a state actor but later is afraid or
intimidated by the prospect of testifying. Ironically, in these cases the most
reliable hearsay evidence is the least likely to be admitted, because
structured interviews that are captured on videotape are most likely to be
deemed testimonial.
B. ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT CRAWFORD
The Supreme Court has refused to review a series of Confrontation
Clause cases dealing with child witnesses, 75 leading the lower courts (and
commentators) to come up with a variety of approaches. One approach is to
argue that children below a certain (as yet indeterminate) age are incapable
of making testimonial statements because they do not understand the
implications of their accusations. 76 This position has not fared well in the
lower courts, particularly when the statements were made to law
75

See Bobadilla v. Carlson, 575 F.3d 785, 787–88 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1081, 1081 (2010); Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 143 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 218,
218 (2008); State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296, 297 (Iowa 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
1655, 1655 (2008); State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Minn. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 382, 382 (2006); State v. Arnold, 933 N.E.2d 775, 777 (Ohio 2010), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 341, 341 (2011). But cf. Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 985 A.2d 847, 850 (Penn.
2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1597, 1598 (2011).
76
Richard Friedman, whose work was a source of inspiration for Crawford, is a leading
advocate of this position. See Richard Friedman, Grappling With the Meaning of
“Testimonial”, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 272 (2005) (“[S]ome very young children should be
considered incapable of being witnesses for Confrontation Clause purposes. Their
understanding is so undeveloped that their words ought to be considered more like the bark
of a bloodhound than like the testimony of an adult witness.”). Most commentators have
similarly argued for a narrower definition of testimonial when children’s statements are
considered, usually on the grounds that children do not understand the nature of the legal
process. See, e.g., Kimberly Y. Chin, Note, “Minute and Separate”: Considering the
Admissibility of Videotaped Forensic Interviews in Child Sexual Abuse Cases After
Crawford and Davis, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 98–99 (2010) (arguing that children’s
statements, except for those naming the perpetrator, should be nontestimonial); Andrew
Darcy, Note, State v. Buda: The New Jersey Supreme Court, the Confrontation Clause, and
“Testimonial” Competence, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1169, 1214 (2010) (arguing that
children’s statements should be judged nontestimonial); Andrew W. Eichner, Note,
Preserving Innocence: Protecting Child Victims in the Post-Crawford Legal System, 38 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 101, 116 (2010–2011) (same); Christopher Cannon Funk, Note, The Reasonable
Child Declarant After Davis v. Washington, 61 STAN. L. REV. 923, 969–70 (2009) (same);
Jonathan Scher, Note, Out-of-Court Statements by Victims of Child Sexual Abuse to
Multidisciplinary Teams: A Confrontation Clause Analysis, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 167, 173
(2009) (same). But see Tom Lininger, Kids Say the Darndest Things: The Prosecutorial Use
of Hearsay Statements by Children, 82 IND. L.J. 999, 999–1000 (2007) (arguing that a
statement should be testimonial if the interviewer anticipated trial use); Robert P. Mosteller,
Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall
Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 996–97 (2007) (arguing that statements should be defined as
testimonial from the perspective of the interviewer, not the child).
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enforcement or their agents. 77 However, the Supreme Court may have
breathed new life into the argument in Michigan v. Bryant, in which it held
that the perspective of the declarant is relevant in determining whether
statements are testimonial.78 Another approach is to find that the purpose of
the interview was not to create evidence for prosecution, but to protect the
child or facilitate medical treatment. 79 Finally, the exigency exception
created by the Court in Davis (and applied in Bryant) has been applied to
cases in which children were conceivably in immediate danger. 80
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss these proposals in
detail. Suffice it to say that many child-witness statements are likely to be
characterized as testimonial, even if all of these approaches ultimately
succeed. For example, when a child has made an initial disclosure, and
actions are taken to protect her from immediate harm, she is often taken to a
child advocacy center to be interviewed by a specially trained child
interviewer. The interview will be videotaped, and both law enforcement
and child-protection workers will observe and provide input (typically from
behind a two-way mirror). 81 The interview will follow an interview
protocol so that the interviewer avoids leading questions and elicits the
most complete report possible. This type of interview is almost always held
to be testimonial.82 Because of law enforcement involvement, it is unlikely
to be characterized as medical or protective. Because a perpetrator has been
identified and initial steps have been taken to protect the child, it is unlikely
to be viewed as an emergency. And because many children are aware of
the potential consequences of their disclosures, it is unlikely that it will be
77

See State v. Siler, 876 N.E.2d 534, 541–44 (Ohio 2007) (reviewing cases and
concluding that child’s statements to law enforcement were testimonial, notwithstanding the
child’s perspective).
78
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). On remand from the Supreme
Court, which instructed it to reconsider its holding in light of Bryant, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the child declarant’s age was relevant in determining if the child’s
statement was testimonial. Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 180–81 (Penn.
2012).
79
See, e.g., State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 780 (N.J. 2008) (finding that statements to
social worker were for purposes of protection rather than prosecution); State v. Arnold, 933
N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ohio 2010) (finding that some statements at child advocacy center were
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and were therefore nontestimonial).
80
See, e.g., Allshouse, 36 A.3d at 178; Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation in Children’s
Cases: The Dimensions of Limited Coverage, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 393, 404–05 (2012); cf.
Christopher C. Kendall, Note, Ongoing Emergency in Incest Cases: Forensic Interviewing
Post-Davis, 10 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 157, 179 (2010) (arguing that children’s
statements should fall under the exigency exception when they report intrafamilial abuse).
81
Theodore P. Cross, Lisa M. Jones, Wendy A. Walsh, Monique Simone & David
Kolko, Child Forensic Interviewing in Children’s Advocacy Centers: Empirical Data on a
Practice Model, 31 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1031, 1033 (2007).
82
See MYERS, supra note 25, at 874–76 (collecting cases).
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characterized as nontestimonial due to the child’s naiveté. Ironically, this
type of interview tends to be the best documentation of the child’s report,
and the strongest evidence that abuse occurred.
III. THE FORFEITURE-BY-WRONGDOING EXCEPTION TO THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Crawford and subsequent cases hinted at another possible approach
when child witnesses are too scared or too young to testify: forfeiture by
wrongdoing. 83 In Crawford, the Court mentioned the concept in passing.
Justifying its position that the protections of the Confrontation Clause are
procedural (testimonial hearsay must be subjected to cross-examination),
rather than substantive (hearsay must be reliable), it noted that forfeiture as
an exception to the confrontation right makes “no claim to be a surrogate
means of assessing reliability,” but rather is founded “on essentially
equitable grounds.” 84 In Davis, in which the Court considered a pair of
domestic violence cases, the Court sought to reassure critics concerned
about the effects of the holding on domestic violence prosecutions by again
referring to forfeiture by wrongdoing. It expanded on the concept by noting
that defendants “have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy
the integrity of the criminal-trial system.” 85 The Court noted that under the
forfeiture doctrine, “one who obtains the absence of a witness by
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.”86
Both Crawford and Davis cited an 1878 case, Reynolds v. United
States, the only previous Supreme Court case to give any serious attention
to the concept of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 87 In Reynolds, George
Reynolds was indicted on bigamy charges for marrying Amelia Jane
Schofield, who lived with him in his home. 88 The sheriff attempted to serve
Schofield several times at Reynolds’s home. 89 On one occasion, he was
83

We have identified only one article focusing on forfeiture in the child abuse context.
The author clearly disagrees with the position adopted here. Clifford S. Fishman, The Child
Declarant, The Confrontation Clause, and the Forfeiture Doctrine, 16 WIDENER L. REV.
279, 302–04 (2010) (rejecting arguments that pre-crime actions or exploitation of a child’s
vulnerability should be a basis for forfeiture).
84
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
85
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
86
Id.
87
Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878); see also Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458,
471–74 (1900) (holding that the defendants did not forfeit their confrontation rights because
“there was not the slightest ground in the evidence to suppose that [the witness] had absented
himself from the trial at the instance, by the procurement, or with the assent of either of the
accused”).
88
98 U.S. at 146, 148.
89
Id. at 149.
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told by Reynolds’s first wife that Schofield had not been there for several
weeks. 90 On another occasion, Reynolds told the sheriff that he would not
help him find Schofield, and that she would “not appear” in the case.91 The
sheriff, after several attempts and failed inquiries in the neighborhood,
never served Schofield. 92
The Court approved admission of Schofield’s former testimony under
the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, concluding that “[t]he Constitution
does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences
of his own wrongful acts; it grants him the privilege of being confronted
with the witnesses against him. But if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses
away, he cannot insist on his privilege.” 93 Reynolds’s intent to keep
Schofield from testifying was established by the fact that he failed to offer
any assistance to the sheriff and in fact boasted to the sheriff that she would
not appear. 94 The only evidence that Reynolds caused Schofield’s
unavailability was that Reynolds cohabited with Schofield, thus giving him
privileged access to her whereabouts.95 This was enough for the Court to
conclude that the burden shifted to Reynolds to demonstrate that he had not
kept her away. 96
The Court squarely faced forfeiture by wrongdoing in Giles. In Giles,
the defendant, Dwayne Giles, was charged with murdering his ex-girlfriend,
Brenda Avie. 97 At trial, the defendant claimed self-defense and testified to
prior acts of violence by Avie. 98 The hearsay at issue involved statements
that Avie had made to the police responding to a domestic violence call
three weeks before her murder. Avie, who was crying when she spoke, told
the officer that Giles had accused her of having an affair, and that after the
two began to argue, Giles grabbed her by the shirt, lifted her off the floor,
and began to choke her. According to Avie, when she broke free and fell to
the floor, Giles punched her in the face and head, and after she broke free
again, he opened a folding knife, held it about three feet away from her, and
threatened to kill her if he found her cheating on him. 99
In order to identify the proper scope of forfeiture, the Court looked to
90

Id.
Id.
92
Id. at 159–60.
93
Id. at 158.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 159.
96
Id. at 160 (“Clearly, enough had been proven to cast the burden upon him of showing
that he had not been instrumental in concealing or keeping the witness away.”).
97
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 356–57 (2008).
98
Id. at 356.
99
Id. at 356–57.
91
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the common law at the time that the Bill of Rights was enacted and found
that hearsay from unavailable witnesses was admissible when they were
“detained” or “kept away” by the “means or procurement” of the
defendant. 100 Giles agreed with Reynolds that the rationale of the rule is
that “a defendant should not be permitted to benefit from his own wrong,”
and added that “[t]he absence of a forfeiture rule covering this sort of
conduct would create an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe,
intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.” 101
Because murder renders a declarant unavailable, the Court did not
question whether the causation element of forfeiture was satisfied. Rather,
the question was intent. The Court rejected an approach in which the
defendant must simply have been aware of the effect of his actions on the
declarant’s unavailability, which would mean the forfeiture rule would
apply in all cases in which the defendant murdered the declarant. Rather,
the plurality (and the concurrence) held that the exception “applied only
when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness
from testifying.” 102
Crucially, Giles acknowledged the role that the dynamics of domestic
violence may play in assessing forfeiture. 103 The plurality opinion
acknowledged that the domestic violence context in which the case
occurred was relevant because domestic violence is often “intended to
dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help.” 104 Hence, it may be
possible to prove that, in committing the crime, the defendant “expressed
the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the
authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution.” 105 The plurality
opinion concluded that “[e]arlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to
dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant
to this inquiry.” 106 The concurrence argued that such intent is equivalent to
the “intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive
relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help,
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process.” 107 The
100

Id. at 359.
Id. at 365.
102
Id. at 359.
103
Id. at 377.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. The plurality opinion was signed by Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito.
107
Id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (“If the evidence for admissibility
shows a continuing relationship of this sort, it would make no sense to suggest that the
oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the instant before he
killed his victim, say, in a fit of anger.”).
101
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dissent argued that mere knowledge, rather than purpose, should be
sufficient and thus agreed with a possible reading of the concurrence:
purpose could be “based on no more than evidence of a history of domestic
violence.” 108 A majority of the Court thus believed that a history of
domestic violence would support a forfeiture finding based on the theory
that repeated violence is motivated by a desire to exert control over the
victim.
A. LESSONS OF REYNOLDS AND GILES
There are several principles that one can extract from Reynolds and
Giles that are significant for considering forfeiture in the context of child
abuse cases. First, intent can be proven based on the dynamics of the crime
with which the defendant is charged. In Giles, five Justices (the three
dissenters and the two concurring Justices) endorsed the view that a court
can presume intent based on a pattern of domestic violence. Two of these
Justices (Souter and Stevens) have since been replaced (by Sotomayor and
Kagan), and the new Justices’ views are unknown. Importantly, however,
all seven of the Justices who have remained on the Court since Giles
recognized the importance of understanding the dynamics of the charged
crime in determining whether forfeiture should occur. We will explore the
dynamics of child sexual abuse in order to see how perpetrators intend to
silence their victims.
Second, the relationship between the defendant and the declarant is
important. This fact was clearly recognized by the Court in Giles, when it
discussed the unique dynamics of domestic violence because, by definition,
domestic violence occurs between family members and intimates. In
Reynolds, the Court recognized that a relationship and cohabitation equates
with influence, so that if one proves intent and a means of carrying out that
intent, causation can be presumed. Following Reynolds, the lower courts
have also recognized the importance of the relationship between the
defendant and the declarant in assessing forfeiture. 109
108

Id. at 406 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., United States v. Montague, 421 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing that defendant’s prior relationship with the witness, his wife, helped inform the
court’s evaluation of the nature of defendant’s post-incarceration communication with the
witness and whether that conduct procured her unavailability); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d
1193, 1197, 1203 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding forfeiture appropriate where defendant paid for the
witness’s lawyer and shared his counsel with her, and noting that defendant had influence
and control over the witness through his decade-long intimate relationship with her); People
v. Pappalardo, 576 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1004–05 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (noting that the close personal
relationship between defendant and witness, while not sufficient in itself to establish “an
unlawful involvement in a witness’s refusal to testify,” lends additional weight to the
conclusion that defendant helped procure her unavailability); see also Mayes v. Sowders,
109
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Moreover, particularly when there is a preexisting relationship
between the defendant and the declarant, the lower courts recognize that the
defendant’s actions need not be threatening in order to influence the
declarant: cajolery can be as powerful a tool. 110 Thus, wrongdoing may be
established where the defendant promised gifts of value or otherwise bribed
the witness 111 or where the defendant played upon the witness’s sympathy
and pleaded with the witness not to testify. 112 Hence, courts applying the
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule often find that outwardly benevolent conduct
is evidence for forfeiture where the defendant and the witness have a
preexisting relationship of trust, affection, or authority. We will see how
child sexual abuse perpetrators use positive inducements to take advantage
of their victims and deter them from disclosing abuse.
Third, the actions that give rise to forfeiture may occur before the
charged crime. It is not necessary that the crime be completed or charges
filed. All of the Justices in Giles believed that the defendant’s actions well
in advance of the charged crime were relevant in assessing his intent. The
lower courts have not gone as far, but they have recognized that the actions
giving rise to forfeiture need not occur post-arrest or post-indictment. 113
621 F.2d 850, 856 n.4 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding that there was no evidence that defendant
procured his cousin’s unavailability, but implying that the close personal and familial
relationship between defendant and witness would be relevant to a forfeiture inquiry).
110
See, e.g., Steele, 684 F.2d at 1198–99, 1203 (applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
rule where witness had been a prostitute for defendant, eventually lived with him and had his
child, and defendant hired a lawyer for witness, paid for the lawyer, and had his own counsel
make arguments on her behalf so she would not have to testify); State v. Hallum, 606
N.W.2d 351, 357–59 (Iowa 2000) (finding forfeiture on the basis of correspondence between
a defendant and his brother where defendant advised his brother not to discuss anything over
the phone, wrote to him “hang in there,” and concluded his letter with “Love ya, bro”);
People v. Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d 860, 861 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (applying forfeiture when defendant
had called victim 300 times from jail, but without evidence that he had threatened harm:
“[t]he power, control, domination and coercion exercised in abusive relationships can be
expressed in terms of violence certainly, but just as real in repeated calls sounding
expressions of love and concern”).
111
See United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[G]iving something of
value to a potential witness could constitute wrongdoing.”).
112
See McClarin v. Smith, No. 05-CV-2478 (DLI), 2007 WL 2323592, at *10 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 2007) (admitting witness’s grand jury testimony and applying the forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine where defendant’s “pleas for sympathy caused [witness] to alter his
grand jury testimony”); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 747 N.E.2d 659, 660–61 (Mass.
2001) (upholding defendant’s conviction for willfully endeavoring to interfere with a witness
where defendant sent sixty letters to his former girlfriend who was the victim of an assault
by defendant, repeatedly begging and pleading with her to lie for defendant regarding the
assault).
113
5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:134
(3d ed. 2007) (stating that intent may exist well in advance of charges being filed); United
States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 660–61 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding forfeiture where defendant
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Child sexual abuse perpetrators plan their approaches; victim selection and
grooming are designed to eliminate the need for post-crime threats.
Fourth, forfeiture can apply even if the declarant had other reasons to
avoid testifying. Neither Reynolds nor Giles considered whether the
declarants had motives to stay silent independent of the defendants’
actions. 114 Commentators have argued that a declarant’s independent
reasons might undermine forfeiture, 115 but support for their position is
lacking. 116 Moreover, the lower courts have recognized that declarants’
killed two witnesses before charges were filed; one had not spoken to the police but had
confronted defendant about killing his brother and defendant knew he had incriminating
information); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 667–69 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing United
States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982)) (“We have never indicated that
Mastrangelo did not apply to a defendant’s procurement of the unavailability of the
declarant unless there was an ongoing proceeding in which the declarant was scheduled to
testify, and we see no reason to do so now.”); cf. Robert P. Mosteller, Giles v. California:
Avoiding Serious Damage to Crawford’s Limited Revolution, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
675, 695 n.76 (2009) (acknowledging that “threats as part of the sex act” and elicited
promises to keep abuse a secret may be sufficient for forfeiture in the child abuse context);
Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: The
Intersection of Competency, Hearsay & Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1019 (2007)
(“[T]he original threats to the child should be presumed to affect the child’s inability to
testify at trial under a forfeiture rationale even though the demonstrated tampering occurred
prior to disclosure.”).
114
Admittedly, one could argue that this is a point unique to these two cases, both
because there was evidence, based on the hearsay itself, that the declarants were willing to
testify (in Reynolds, the declarant had previously testified against the defendant, and in
Giles, the declarant had called the police against the defendant), and because the defendants
made the declarants physically rather than psychologically unavailable. When the question
is whether the defendant was responsible for the declarant’s unwillingness (rather than
inability) to testify, possible alternative explanations for the declarant’s unwillingness may
be relevant to the causation inquiry.
115
See James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for
“Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1193, 1211 (2006) [hereinafter
Confrontation]; James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in
Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459, 486 (2003) [hereinafter Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing].
116
Professor Flanagan argues that United States v. Williamson, 792 F. Supp. 805 (M.D.
Ga. 1992), vacated, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), is a possible example of a case where a witness’s
independent reason “severs the link between the defendant’s misconduct and the loss of the
evidence.” Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 115, at 486. In Williamson, the
court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the defendant procured the witness’s
unavailability by paying for the witness’s attorney’s fees in part because the witness had
independent reasons for asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege at trial. Id. at 486 nn.165–
66. The court found that the witness asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege because he had
a pending appeal to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, and had he offered
self-incriminatory testimony, the benefits of the appeal would be nullified. Id. Thus, the
witness’s independent reasons caused him to assert the privilege. But, as Professor Flanagan
notes, the prosecution could not establish that the defendant’s actions would have caused
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purported reasons for their unavailability are often themselves the product
of the defendants’ influence 117 or simply not credible.118 Extending the
argument, we will argue that perpetrators should be held responsible for
their victims’ unavailability when they exploit or cultivate preexisting
frailties.
Fifth, forfeiture can apply even if the defendant had other reasons to
commit the wrongdoing. 119 When Reynolds kept his wife’s whereabouts a
secret, his only apparent motivation for doing so was to prevent her from
being served. But when Giles murdered his ex-girlfriend, he was surely
motivated as much by jealousy as by a desire to prevent her from testifying
to the prior abuse; her statement to the police notes that he “threatened to
kill her if he found her cheating on him.” 120 Perpetrators obviously abuse
children because of their sexual interest and not because they wish to render
unavailability even in the absence of the witness’s valid reason for refusing to testify. Id. at
486 n.167. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate either that there
was any agreement between the defendant and the witness to keep silent or that the witness
knew that the defendant was paying his legal fees. Id. Thus, this is not a case where the
defendant’s independent reason for asserting the privilege destroyed causation; indeed, there
was simply no causal link to destroy in the first instance.
117
See United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 630 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that a
witness’s assertions that his earlier statements to police were made while under pressure and
duress of the government, and that he simply wanted not to be involved were further
evidence that the witness was scared of defendant). Courts also face similar causation issues
where the witness avoids testimony by asserting a privilege, such as the witness’s Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. When the evidence demonstrates that the
defendant influenced or coerced the witness’s decision, courts find the defendant responsible
for the witness’s unavailability. See, e.g., United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 651 (6th
Cir. 1975); Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437, 443 (9th Cir. 1964).
118
The courts are free to regard such reasons with skepticism, and many have done so.
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 763–64 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting defendant’s
assertion that he refused to testify for religious reasons); McClarin v. Smith, No. 05-CV2478 (DLI), 2007 WL 2323592, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2007) (rejecting witness’s
assertion that he did not feel threatened by defendant); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351,
358 (Iowa 2000) (finding not credible a witness’s statement that he had not been pressured
by defendant in any way and that he would refuse to testify even if defendant wanted him to
do so); State v. Pierce, 364 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Minn. 1985) (rejecting incarcerated witness’s
claim that he refused to testify because he feared he would be known as a snitch to other
inmates, and not because of defendant’s threats); People v. Cotto, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38–39
(App. Div. 1998) (finding a witness’s explanation that he did not want to testify because he
did not want to miss a parole hearing not credible); People v. Serrano, 644 N.Y.S.2d 162,
162 (App. Div. 1996) (rejecting witness’s claims that he was not intimidated by defendant);
People v. Pappalardo, 576 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1002–03 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (finding that witness’s
claim of amnesia was feigned and that defendant assisted the witness in contriving the plan
to avoid testimony); see also Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 115, at 485.
119
See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996).
120
See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 357 (2008).
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them unavailable. Our argument for forfeiture will not be that perpetrators
abuse children in order to silence them. Rather, we will show that the way
in which they abuse children is designed to maintain their cooperation and
silence.
Finally, forfeiture is not limited to cases in which the hearsay
statements were themselves under oath and subject to cross-examination.
Historical analysis 121 and Reynolds suggested that this was so, 122 but none
of the Justices in Giles expressed this view. The prototypical hearsay
statements in child sexual abuse cases are structured, videotaped interviews.
The child may have been given a child-friendly version of an oath, 123 but
cross-examination is obviously lacking.
Reynolds and Giles are complementary. One might read Reynolds to
suggest that direct evidence of intent must be provided, but, given Giles, it
is more consistent to assume that the Court in Reynolds believed that the
strong facts of intent before it were sufficient rather than necessary. Giles
illustrates how the dynamics of the charged acts can inform an analysis of
what the defendant intended, even when direct evidence is lacking.
Similarly, one might read Giles to suggest that clear evidence of causation
must be provided (murdering a declarant clearly renders her unavailable);
but, given Reynolds, it is more consistent to assume that Giles found the
evidence of causation sufficient rather than necessary. Reynolds presumed
causation merely based on cohabitation. Read together, the opinions
suggest a flexible approach for considering whether a defendant forfeited
his right to cross-examine an unavailable declarant.
Flexibility with respect to applying forfeiture is justifiable for two
reasons. First, proof of forfeiture becomes more difficult as the defendant’s
wrongdoing becomes more successful. If the defendant keeps the declarant
off the stand altogether, then she cannot explain her absence. If the
defendant successfully threatens the victim, she will be deterred from
explaining to the court the reasons for her uncooperativeness. 124 If the
121

Thomas Y. Davies, Selective Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects of Giles’s
Forfeiture Exception to Confrontation Were or Were Not “Established at the Time of the
Founding,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 619, 649 (2009).
122
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878) (“The accused was present at the
time the [former] testimony was given, and had full opportunity of cross-examination.”).
123
Child interviewers are often advised to elicit a promise to tell the truth. See Thomas
D. Lyon, Assessing the Competency of Child Witnesses: Best Practice Informed by
Psychology and Law, in CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY: A HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 69, 80 (Michael E. Lamb et al. eds., 2011). Promising is often an
acceptable substitute for a formal oath when young children testify. See, e.g., CAL. EVID.
CODE § 710 (2012).
124
See United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (“It seems almost certain
that, in a case involving coercion or threats, a witness who refuses to testify at trial will not
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defendant is particularly clever and colludes with the declarant, then she
will provide alternative explanations for her uncooperativeness, which the
defendant can point to as undermining causation.
Second, it is important to reiterate that forfeiture is an equitable
principle: one should not be permitted to benefit from one’s wrong. From
the perspective of fairness, intent is more important than causation. If the
defendant desired that the declarant fail to testify and took actions to fulfill
that desire, then the defendant should not be heard to complain if the
declarant does not testify.
A focus on intent admittedly conflicts with the forfeiture-bywrongdoing hearsay exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
However, the forfeiture-byrequires both intent and causation. 125
wrongdoing hearsay exception is not synonymous with constitutional
doctrine, because the hearsay exception is concerned with both equity and
reliability. 126 Causation is most important when forfeiture is used as an
exception to the hearsay rule. A clear causal connection between the
defendant’s actions and the declarant’s failure to testify increases the
reliability of the statement. If the defendant’s actions are not the cause, an
alternative explanation for the declarant’s failure to testify is that her
statements were unreliable and she feared committing perjury.
Proof of intent should presumptively satisfy a constitutional forfeiture
claim, but need not suffice as an exception to the hearsay rule. Forfeiture
may make it fair to admit testimonial hearsay from an unavailable declarant,
but the statutory rules regarding hearsay and the defendant’s due process
rights may still apply to assess the reliability of the hearsay. 127 We will
testify to the actions procuring his or her unavailability.”); see also State v. Mechling, 633
S.E.2d 311, 326 (W. Va. 2006) (“If a victim is too scared to testify against the accused, for
fear of retribution, the victim will probably also be too scared to testify in any pre-trial
forfeiture proceeding.”).
125
See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
126
Although the Court in Davis stated that the federal rule “codifies the forfeiture
doctrine,” it emphasized that its holding took “no position on the standards necessary to
demonstrate such forfeiture.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006). The plurality
opinion in Giles read the intent requirement in the federal rule as “highly persuasive”
evidence that constitutional forfeiture required intent. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 368
(2008). Giles did not address the causation issue because murder always renders a declarant
unavailable.
127
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1162 n.13 (2011) (“[T]he Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may constitute a further bar to admission of, for
example, unreliable evidence.”). The plurality opinion in Giles rejected the dissent’s
argument that confrontation issues could be separated from hearsay issues, but only as a
means of rejecting the argument that the dying declaration exception is consistent with the
notion that knowledge-based intent is sufficient for forfeiture to occur. Giles, 554 U.S. at
364–65.
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argue that it is not always necessary that a defendant cause a declarant’s
unavailability for forfeiture to apply; rather, it is sufficient if the defendant
exploited the declarant’s unavailability.
B. FORFEITURE BY EXPLOITATION
We propose that criminal defendants forfeit their rights to crossexamine a child witness if they exploit a child’s reasonably foreseeable
unavailability. Exploitation includes taking advantage of vulnerabilities as
well as creating or accentuating those vulnerabilities through one’s actions.
Child sexual abusers exploit their victims’ vulnerabilities and immaturity.
Perpetrators choose vulnerable victims, escalate the abuse over time, and
cajole and threaten children into continued silence.
Technically, the defendant who exploits a child’s foreseeable
unavailability need not cause that unavailability. One can either take
advantage of preexisting vulnerabilities or create them. In either case, one’s
intent is to ensure that the victim will be unavailable. Practically,
defendants will usually take actions to guarantee that vulnerable victims
remain so. When they take those steps, they have clearly both taken
advantage of and caused unavailability.
States should amend their special hearsay exceptions for children’s
complaints of abuse. The statutes currently require that, in order to admit
this hearsay, courts find indicia of reliability and, when the child is
unavailable, corroborative evidence of abuse. In order to comport with
Crawford and Giles, the statutes could additionally require that if the child
is unavailable and the statements are testimonial, the court must find that
the defendant exploited the child’s foreseeable unavailability before
admitting this hearsay. 128
Proof of exploitation will entail an examination of the relationship
between the perpetrator and the child. Parents and adult household
members enjoy authority and private access, as do professionals who care
for and interact with children. In extrafamilial abuse, it is important to
consider the extent and kinds of interaction between the child and the
perpetrator. Child interviewers should ask the child about the pre-abuse
relationship; the progression of abuse; the perpetrator’s statements to the
child about the abuse and the consequences of disclosure; the child’s
reasons for disclosing (and, if appropriate, for delaying disclosure); and the
child’s feelings about the effects of disclosure. Recipients of the child’s
128
NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 20, at 369 (“[A] majority
of states have a special child hearsay exception . . . Whether hearsay is offered under a
residual or a child hearsay exception, the critical issue is usually whether the hearsay is
sufficiently reliable to gain admission in evidence.”).
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disclosure can provide information about the context in which the
disclosure occurred and the child’s explanations, if any, for delays.
IV. THE DYNAMICS OF CHILD ABUSE
Understanding the dynamics of child sexual abuse is helpful in
applying the principles of forfeiture by wrongdoing to child witnesses. The
dynamics of abuse speak to both intent and causation. Intent is addressed
from the perpetrator’s perspective, and looks to the process of victim
selection, seduction, and silencing. Causation is addressed from the child’s
perspective, and focuses on immaturity, filial dependency, self-blame, and
secrecy. Although the focus here is on sexual abuse, many of the factors
discussed here also keep child witnesses to other crimes off the stand.129
There are several sources of information regarding the nature of child
sexual abuse, including interviews with admitted perpetrators; population
surveys; and clinical samples drawn from medical contexts, social service
investigations, criminal investigations, dependency court, and criminal
court. 130
A popular conception of the molester is a stranger who grabs a child
off the street. This type of perpetrator’s strategy for avoiding detection is to
conceal his identity. He might threaten the child not to tell, but such a
threat may carry little weight because the child has no desire to protect the
perpetrator. The perpetrator is unlikely to have continuing contact with the
129

See infra notes 304–308 and accompanying text.
Clinical studies have been reviewed in Kamala London et al., Disclosure of Child
Sexual Abuse: What Does the Research Tell Us About the Ways that Children Tell?, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 194, 195–96 (2005) [hereinafter Disclosure of Child Sexual
Abuse]; Kamala London et al., Review of the Contemporary Literature on How Children
Report Sexual Abuse to Others: Findings, Methodological Issues, and Implications for
Forensic Interviewers, 16 MEMORY 29, 30 (2008) [hereinafter Review of Contemporary
Literature on How Children Report Sexual Abuse]; Thomas D. Lyon, False Denials:
Overcoming Methodological Biases in Abuse Disclosure Research, in DISCLOSING ABUSE:
DELAYS, DENIALS, RETRACTIONS AND INCOMPLETE ACCOUNTS 41, 41–43 (Margaret-Ellen
Pipe et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter False Denials]; and Thomas D. Lyon, Scientific Support
for Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 107, 120–23 (Jon R. Conte ed., 2002). Population surveys were reviewed by
London et al., supra, and Thomas D. Lyon, Abuse Disclosure: What Adults Can Tell, in
CHILDREN AS VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND OFFENDERS: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW
19 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Abuse Disclosure]. Research asking
child sex perpetrators to describe their modi operandi dates back at least to the 1960s. PAUL
H. GEBHARD ET AL., SEX OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF TYPES 12–13 (1964). A review
published in 2009 surveyed the results of 19 studies. Benoit Leclerc et al., Examining the
Modus Operandi of Sexual Offenders Against Children and Its Practical Implications, 14
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 5, 6–7 (2009). An overview of all of the literature can be
found in Thomas D. Lyon & Elizabeth Ahern, Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse, in THE
APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 233 (John E.B. Myers ed., 3d ed. 2011).
130
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child, and by virtue of the violent abduction, the child does not feel
complicit in the crime. The child may fail to disclose the abuse because of
her immaturity or her inherent sense that she was somehow to blame, but
from an intent perspective, the stranger perpetrator has acted more out of
impulse than cunning.
In contrast, in the typical case of child abuse, the perpetrator is a
parent, a parent figure, or a familiar and authoritative adult. The perpetrator
selects his victim on the basis of immaturity, vulnerability, and private
access. The perpetrator befriends the child before he abuses the child and
introduces more serious sexual acts only gradually, so as to maintain the
child’s trust and monitor the child’s continuing compliance and
secretiveness. Once abuse has begun, the perpetrator maintains secrecy
through admonishments and occasional threats. The success of the
perpetrator’s approach is demonstrated by the child’s failure to disclose the
abuse immediately.
A. VICTIM CHOICE: EXPLOITATION OF THE VULNERABLE CHILD
Virtually all sexual abuse is perpetrated by someone the child knows.
In Smallbone and Wortley’s survey of 182 child sex perpetrators, only “6.5
percent of offenders had their first sexual contact with a stranger.” 131
Population surveys confirm that with the exception of noncontact offenses
(such as exhibitionism), strangers are rarely the perpetrators.132 Similarly,
criminal samples are made up primarily of perpetrators familiar to the child,
131

STEPHEN W. SMALLBONE & RICHARD K. WORTLEY, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY,
NO. 193, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS AND MODUS OPERANDI 4
(2001).
132
Jessie Anderson et al., Prevalence of Childhood Sexual Abuse Experiences in a
Community Sample of Women, 32 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 911,
913, 915 (1993) (defining sexual abuse as “exposure, spying, indecent suggestions and
pornography”; 15% strangers); D. M. Fergusson et al., The Stability of Child Abuse Reports:
A Longitudinal Study of the Reporting Behavior of Young Adults, 30 PSYCHOL. MED. 529,
532 (2000) [hereinafter Stability of Child Abuse Reports] (defining sexual abuse as
“noncontact episodes including indecent exposure, public masturbation by others, and
unwanted sexual propositions or lewd suggestions”; 29% strangers); David Finkelhor et al.,
Sexual Abuse in a National Survey of Adult Men and Women: Prevalence, Characteristics,
and Risk Factors, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 19, 22 (1990) (defining sexual abuse as
exhibitionism and sexual exposure; 40% strangers); Jillian M. Fleming, Prevalence of
Childhood Sexual Abuse in a Community Sample of Australian Women, 166 MED. J. AUSTL.
65, 66 (1997) (defining sexual abuse as all experiences of sexual contact occurring before
the age of 12 with a person five or more years older, irrespective of consent, and all
experiences of sexual contact occurring between the ages of 12 and 16 with a person five or
more years older that were not wanted or were distressing; 8% strangers); Daniel W. Smith
et al., Delay in Disclosure of Childhood Rape: Results From a National Survey, 24 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 273, 278 (2000) [hereinafter Disclosure of Childhood Rape] (considering
genital penetration and “use or threat of force, as defined by the participant”; 10% strangers).
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with the most common single type a parent or parent figure. 133 Evans and
Lyon examined transcripts of over 400 children who testified in felony
sexual abuse cases prosecuted in Los Angeles County over a five-year
period and found that the defendant was a stranger to the child only 13% of
the time. 134 This is also true with respect to the production of child
pornography: only 4% of images confiscated by the police were
photographed by strangers to the child, whereas 37% were photographed by
parents, stepparents, or other relatives. 135
It is not an accident that perpetrators target children they know.
133

ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 83
(1993) (“The abusers were people known to the children, for the most part; only slightly
fewer were actually family members (45.2%) than the proportion who were outside the
family (54.8%).”); id. at 85 (“They were strangers to the child 13.7% of the time.”); LOUISE
DEZWIREK SAS ET EL., TIPPING THE BALANCE TO TELL THE SECRET: PUBLIC DISCOVERY OF
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 24 (1995) (“[T]hese children were typically abused by someone
known to them. In fact one-third of the children had known the abusers all their lives. More
than one-fifth of the abusers were fathers or father figures.”); id. at 26 (for all but 16% of the
children, there had been an existing relationship with the abuser); BARBARA E. SMITH ET AL.,
AM. BAR ASS’N, THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE CASES: FINAL
REPORT 86 (1993) [hereinafter A.B.A. FINAL REPORT] (“The relationship between the
defendant and the victim in our sample reflects figures comparable to other studies. Only
6% of the defendants were strangers to their victims. The most common relationship was
that of parent, or a parental figure.”); DEBRA WHITCOMB ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
EMOTIONAL EFFECTS OF TESTIFYING ON SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN 89 (1994) (a majority
of perpetrators were related in some way to the victim (i.e., intrafamilial cases); the largest
categories were biological parents (14%), mothers’ boyfriends (14%), and stepparents
(13%); in only 3% of cases were perpetrators unknown to their victims); Tina B. GoodmanBrown et al., Why Children Tell: A Model of Children’s Disclosure of Sexual Abuse, 27
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 525, 530 (2003) (“Approximately 47% of the children suffered
intrafamilial abuse, which was defined as abuse by a parent, step-parent, grandparent,
mother’s boyfriend or other relative; the 52% of children who experienced extrafamilial
abuse were victimized by such individuals as teachers, babysitters, neighbors, or in a few
cases, strangers.”).
134
Angela D. Evans & Thomas D. Lyon, Assessing Children’s Competency to Take the
Oath in Court: The Influence of Question Type on Children’s Accuracy, 36 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 195, 197 (2012).
135
Elaine Silverstrini, Child Porn’s Dirty Secret: Dads Often Behind Bars, TAMPA BAY
ONLINE (July 5, 2009), www2.tbo.com/content/2009/jul/05/na-child-porns-dirtysecret-dadsoften-behind-lens/news-breaking/ (noting that the Exploited Child Division of the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which operates as a clearinghouse for law
enforcement to share information about child pornography victims, has identified over 2,300
of the children featured in pornographic images and videos since 2003, and that 24% of
victims were photographed by neighbors or close family friends); see also Janis Wolak et al.,
Arrests for Child Pornography Production: Data at Two Time Points From a National
Sample of U.S. Law Enforcement Agencies, 16 CHILD MALTREATMENT 184, 185 (2011)
(“Most [child pornography] appears to be produced by child sexual abusers who know and
have intimate access to specific victims (e.g., family or household members; acquaintances
such as neighbors, family friends, baby sitters).”).
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Perpetrators choose victims on the basis of their accessibility; children
living in perpetrators’ homes or with whom perpetrators work are most
accessible. Sullivan and Beech interviewed forty-one perpetrators who
molested children with whom they worked and found that 15% chose their
profession exclusively to provide them access to victims; another 42%
acknowledged that this partially motivated their job choice.136
Within the group of potential victims, perpetrators often acknowledge
that they look for the most vulnerable children. Conte and colleagues found
that perpetrators “claimed a special ability to identify vulnerable
children.” 137 Vulnerability was defined both in terms of a child’s status
(e.g., living in a divorced home or being young) and in terms of her
emotional or psychological state (e.g., a needy child, a depressed or
unhappy child). 138 Forty-nine percent of the sex perpetrators interviewed
by Elliott and colleagues stated that they targeted children who lacked selfconfidence or self-esteem. 139 Beauregard and colleagues noted that child
sex perpetrators often targeted “a child with family problems, without
supervision, always on the street and in need of help.” 140
By choosing a victim from among family and friends, perpetrators
ensure that their contact with the victim will be perceived by others as
prosocial, and therefore will not arouse suspicion. This is also true of the
child’s perception of the perpetrator: the perpetrator is in a position of trust
and authority, and the child will interpret interest as paternalistic rather than
predatory.
B. GROOMING OF THE VICTIM
Perpetrators emphasize the extent to which they seduce their victims
over time rather than commit isolated assaults. Most child molestation
typically includes attempts to obtain the assent and cooperation of victims.
The first step for the sex perpetrator is to befriend the child, typically before
any kind of physical contact is attempted. Leclerc and colleagues noted that
child sex perpetrators adopt strategies “that are similar to prosocial
behaviors which consist of demonstrating love, attention and
136
Joe Sullivan & Anthony Beech, A Comparative Study of Demographic Data Relating
to Intra- and Extra-Familial Child Sexual Abusers and Professional Perpetrators, 10 J.
SEXUAL AGGRESSION 39, 46 (2004).
137
Jon R. Conte et al., What Sexual Offenders Tell Us About Prevention Strategies, 13
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 293, 299 (1989).
138
Id.
139
Michele Elliott et al., Child Sexual Abuse Prevention: What Offenders Tell Us, 19
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 579, 581 (1995).
140
Eric Beauregard et al., A Descriptive Model of the Hunting Process of Serial Sex
Offenders: A Rational Choice Perspective, 22 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 449, 455 (2007).
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appreciation.” 141 Both intrafamilial and extrafamilial sex perpetrators
describe spending time with the child 142 and giving the child gifts, 143
sometimes introducing children to alcohol and pornography. 144 The first
sexual contact often does not occur for a substantial period of time,
particularly given the speed with which children, particularly younger
children, can form attachments to adults. In Smallbone and Wortley’s
study, 76% of the intrafamilial perpetrators, 28% of the extrafamilial
perpetrators, and 39% of the mixed-type perpetrators knew the child for
more than one year before initiating abuse.145
The second step is to desensitize the child to sexual touch through
progressively more invasive sexual touch and talk. Kaufman and
colleagues 146 found this to be the most-often-endorsed means of obtaining
the child’s compliance by both intrafamilial and extrafamilial child sex
perpetrators. 147 This approach has several purposes. The perpetrator can
test the child’s willingness to acquiesce 148 and the likelihood that the child
will disclose. 149 If the child discloses at an early stage of the process, the
perpetrator can claim that the touch was merely affectionate, accidental, or
otherwise nonsexual. 150 As the abuse progresses, the perpetrator can assure
the child of the harmlessness and morality of his actions. 151
When the sexual abuser is the child’s parent, the extra attention paid to
the child not only has the effect of making the child feel special, but also
141

Leclerc et al., supra note 130, at 8.
John R. Christiansen & Reed H. Blake, The Grooming Process in Father-Daughter
Incest, in THE INCEST PERPETRATOR: THE FAMILY MEMBER NO ONE WANTS TO TREAT 88, 89
(Anne L. Horton et al. eds., 1990); SMALLBONE & WORTLEY, supra note 131, at 4.
143
Lee Eric Budin & Charles Felzen Johnson, Sex Abuse Prevention Programs:
Offenders’ Attitudes About Their Efficacy, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 77, 84 (1989);
Christiansen & Blake, supra note 142, at 90; Keith Kaufman et al., Factors Influencing
Sexual Offenders’ Modus Operandi: An Examination of Victim-Offender Relatedness and
Age, 3 CHILD MALTREATMENT 349, 353 (1998).
144
Even perpetrators who offend against strangers endorse strategies short of brute force;
Beauregard and colleagues described the “hunting process” of sixty-nine serial sex
perpetrators who offended against strangers and found that “[t]hree methods are used by
sexual offenders specifically against children: seduction/persuasion (13%), money/gift
(16%), and games (9%). These methods help perpetrators make contact with the victims
slowly and to gradually estimate their chance of succeeding in getting the victim involved in
sexual activities.” Beauregard et al., supra note 140, at 456.
145
SMALLBONE & WORTLEY, supra note 131, at 5.
146
Kaufman et al., supra note 143, at 356.
147
Reuben A. Lang & Roy R. Frenzel, How Sex Offenders Lure Children, 1 ANNALS SEX
RES. 303, 307–09 (1988).
148
Christiansen & Blake, supra note 142, at 92.
149
Kaufman et al., supra note 143, at 356.
150
Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 307–08.
151
Christiansen & Blake, supra note 142, at 89.
142
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isolates the child and the offending parent from the other family members.
Christiansen and Blake found that “[p]otential victims become alienated
from the mothers because these daughters are placed by their fathers in their
mothers’ traditional role of confidante, intimate friend, and sex partner.
Alienation from siblings occurs because of the privileges and special favors
potential victims receive.”152
Third, the perpetrator initiates overtly sexual acts. In part because of
careful victim selection and preparation, this need not involve violent force.
In Fleming’s population survey, only 7% of victims recalled actual
violence, whereas 64% recalled verbal threats (including threats of
violence), and 72% stated that some form of coercion was used. 153 In
Hershkowitz’s large study of sexual abuse cases investigated in Israel,
children reported coercion in 30% of the cases, and threats in only 10%. 154
In Lang and Frenzel’s sample, two-thirds of the sex perpetrators “frightened
the children in some way.” 155
Much of the persuasive power comes from the perpetrator’s status as
an adult. Kaufman and colleagues pointed out that adults’ “greater physical
sizes, statuses afforded by their age (i.e., ‘When adults tell you to do
something, you listen’), and greater perceived credibility may reduce the
need for explicit threats to gain victim compliance in abusive sexual
activity.” 156 They found that when comparing adolescent to adult
perpetrators, adults endorsed fewer strategies for obtaining compliance and
in particular, adults were less likely to have threatened the child with a
weapon.
When perpetrators do endorse strategies for inducing compliance, they
mention a mixture of bribes and threats, and the strategies are similar for
both intrafamilial and extrafamilial perpetrators. 157 In Lang and Frenzel’s
sample, bribery was as common as physical force. 158 Kaufman and
colleagues found that the most common form of bribery was giving gifts,
and that the most common threat—particularly among intrafamilial
perpetrators—was to prey on children’s helplessness by threatening to “tell
on them about having sex with [the perpetrator] or by making them feel as
152

Id. at 90.
Fleming, supra note 132, at 5. Finkelhor and colleagues revealed that men reported
force in 15% of acts of sexual abuse and women in 19%, but that abuse included noncontact
offenses. Finkelhor et al., supra note 132, at 21.
154
Irit Hershkowitz, Delayed Disclosure of Alleged Child Sexual Abuse Victims in Israel,
76 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 444, 446 (2006) [hereinafter Delayed Disclosure].
155
Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 311.
156
Kaufman et al., supra note 143, at 351.
157
Id. at 356–57; Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 310–11.
158
Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 311.
153
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if there was nothing they could do to stop it.” 159 Researchers have
speculated that the efficacy of such a threat is founded on the
desensitization process: “[V]ictims’ repeated acquiescence early in the
grooming process (e.g., to nonsexual touch) may lead victims to believe
that they have granted permission for more intrusive sexual contact.”160
The fact that perpetrators fail to use force does not mean that they are
unwilling to use it or incapable of doing so. Most of the perpetrators in
Elliott and colleagues’ study stated that if the child resisted, they would stop
and try to initiate contact later (61%), but a substantial minority (39%)
admitted that they would then resort to threats or actual violence in order to
complete the act.161 Perpetrators may also understate their use of force in
an attempt to minimize the seriousness of their acts. In Christiansen and
Blake’s sample of fathers who abused their daughters, less than one-fourth
acknowledged using threats or physical punishment, but almost half of the
victims (45%) claimed they had.162
With respect to criminal cases, prosecutors may be more willing to
charge when force is involved, as this is likely to be more convincing to
jurors. Nevertheless, in criminal samples, abuse without the use of force
also predominates. Smith and colleagues, for example, emphasized that “in
the vast majority of cases, the sexual abuse was imposed on the child by the
defendant simply by using his/her authority, or stature, as an adult.” 163 In
Sas and Cunningham’s sample of children who testified in sexual abuse
prosecutions, 30% did not even realize that the sexual act was wrong when
it first occurred. 164
C. THE EFFECTS OF VICTIM CHOICE AND GROOMING:
NONDISCLOSURE
Because of the means by which the perpetrator has selected and
groomed his victim, disclosure is unlikely. Population surveys reveal that
most respondents who report having been abused as children delayed
disclosing the abuse for more than a year, 165 a large percentage had never
159

Kaufman et al., supra note 143, at 355.
Id. at 356; see also Conte et al., supra note 137, at 300.
161
Elliott et al., supra note 139, at 582.
162
Christiansen & Blake, supra note 142, at 96.
163
SMITH ET AL., A.B.A. FINAL REPORT, supra note 133, at 89. The authors found that
“the defendant actually overpowered (or took other steps) to inflict the abuse or to further
weaken the child into submission” in only 12% of the cases and used bribes in only 8% of
the cases. Id. at 90, 92; cf. WHITCOMB ET AL., supra note 133, at 91 (53% no force, 33%
mild force, 5% violent force, 8% threat of force).
164
SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 26.
165
Finkelhor et al., supra note 132, at 22 (57% of men and 59% of women delayed more
160
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told anyone before the survey, 166 and 90% of the abuse was never reported
to authorities. 167
Obviously, because disclosure is the primary means by which abuse is
discovered, abuse that is never disclosed to authorities will rarely if ever
find its way into clinical samples or criminal case samples of abuse.
Indeed, perpetrators typically admit having had a number of victims whose
abuse was never brought to the attention of the authorities. 168
However, the extent to which perpetrators succeed in silencing their
victims in clinical and criminal samples can be assessed by examining
delays in disclosure. Clinical samples confirm that delays are common. 169
In criminal samples, delays are common as well. In Sas and Cunningham’s
sample, two-thirds of the child witnesses reported having delayed reporting
more than forty-eight hours after abuse, and one-third delayed more than a
year after the first time abuse occurred.170
Further evidence of nondisclosure can be found in the statistics on
repeated abuse. If the child fails to report the abuse when it first occurs, it
is likely to occur again.171 Over two-thirds of perpetrators report abusing
the same victim over time. 172 Charges of repeated abuse are also the norm
in criminal samples,173 and charges provide a conservative measure of
than one year); Fleming, supra note 132, at 5–6 (83% did not disclose within 1 year); Smith
et al., Disclosure of Childhood Rape, supra note 133, at 279 tbl.3 (48% did not disclose
within 5 years).
166
Lyon, Abuse Disclosure, supra note 130, at 23 tbl.2.1 (13%–60% had never told
anyone).
167
Judy Martin et al., Asking About Child Sexual Abuse: Methodological Implications of
a Two Stage Survey, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 383, 387 (1993); Diana E. H. Russell, The
Incidence and Prevalence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of Female
Children, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 133, 142 (1983); Smith et al., Disclosure of Childhood
Rape, supra note 132, at 279.
168
Gene G. Abel et al., Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Nonincarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3, 21 (1987).
169
Lyon, False Denials, supra note 130, at 42, 46–48. See generally London et al.,
Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 130 (describing a number of studies that have
found a delay in reporting is common); Mary L. Paine & David J. Hansen, Factors
Influencing Children to Self-Disclose Sexual Abuse, 22 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 271 (2002).
170
SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 26, 29. Goodman-Brown and colleagues reported that
only 15% of the child witnesses delayed reporting for more than six months, but they
measured delay from the last time the child was abused rather than from the first time, which
means that delay was underestimated for children who experienced repeated abuse.
Goodman-Brown, supra note 133, at 533.
171
SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 28 (when disclosure was delayed, abuse reoccurred in
70% of the cases).
172
Elliott et al., supra note 139, at 586; SMALLBONE & WORTLEY, supra note 131, at 4.
173
GRAY, supra note 133, at 90 (single act charged in only 39% of cases); WHITCOMB ET
AL., supra note 133, at 91 (single act charged in only 43% of cases).

1210

THOMAS D. LYON & JULIA A. DENTE

[Vol. 102

whether abuse was repeated, because prosecutors often charge only what
they are most confident they can prove and specifying individual acts is
often difficult for child witnesses. 174
If the perpetrator has selected a child within his family or under his
care, he can rely on the natural bonds between child and family to prevent
disclosure. The most common factor that predicts delay in reporting abuse
is the relationship between the perpetrator and the child: the closer the
relationship, the longer the delay. This is true in population surveys, 175
clinical samples,176 and criminal samples.177 The relationship also affects
the likelihood that the child will be inconsistent in her reports and
ultimately recant the allegation of abuse.178 Indeed, when asked, children
endorse different rates of disclosure against parents and against strangers.
By four years of age, children will predict less disclosure of parental
transgressions than stranger transgressions (when asked what children
“would” do), and by six years of age, children will endorse this difference
as a norm (when asked what children “should” do). 179 By six years of age,
children also make distinctions among the recipients of their disclosures,
particularly disfavoring the reporting of parental transgressions to the

174

See Lindsay Wandrey et al., Maltreated Children’s Ability to Estimate Temporal
Location and Numerosity of Placement Changes and Court Visits, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 79, 99 (2012).
175
Four of the five representative surveys that tested for the effects of relationships on
disclosure found that the relationship mattered, with closer relationships leading to lower
rates of reported disclosure. Anderson et al., supra note 132, at 915; Steven M. Kogan,
Disclosing Unwanted Sexual Experiences: Results from a National Sample of Adolescent
Women, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 147, 154 (2004); Smith et al., Disclosure of Childhood
Rape, supra note 132, at 281; Gail E. Wyatt & Michael Newcomb, Internal and External
Mediators of Women’s Sexual Abuse in Childhood, 58 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
758, 765 (1990). But see Fleming, supra note 132, at 68 (finding no relation). Moreover, a
study examining the same sample as Smith and colleagues found that reporting to the police
was more likely when the perpetrator was a stranger. Rochelle F. Hanson et al., Factors
Related to the Reporting of Childhood Rape, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 559, 566 (1999).
Three of these studies utilized a multivariate design, which enabled the researchers to control
for possible confounding by interactions between relationship and other characteristics of
abuse that might affect reporting. See Kogan, supra; Smith et al., Disclosure of Childhood
Rape, supra note 132, at 281; Wyatt, supra.
176
London et al., Review of Contemporary Literature on How Children Report Sexual
Abuse, supra note 130. This modifies the view of the authors’ earlier review of the
literature. See London et al., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 130.
177
SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 27–30.
178
Lindsay C. Malloy et al., Filial Dependency and Recantation of Child Sexual Abuse
Allegations, 46 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 162, 165 (2007).
179
Thomas D. Lyon et al., Children’s Reasoning about Disclosing Adult Transgressions:
Effects of Maltreatment, Child Age, and Adult Identity, 81 CHILD DEV. 1714, 1720–21 (2010)
[hereinafter Disclosing Adult Transgressions].
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police. 180 In laboratory research where children observe a parent or a
stranger commit a minor transgression (such as stealing a book), children
are more likely to keep secrets for the parent. 181
If the perpetrator is close to the child’s mother, the mother is less
likely to believe her child when the child discloses abuse.182 If the mother
is unsupportive, the child is less likely to disclose in the first place,183 more
likely to delay reporting, 184 and more likely to recant her allegations.185
Of course, not all parents are positive figures in children’s lives, and
many perpetrators can expect secrecy from their victims because of fear
rather than respect. In their sample of sexual abuse cases tried in criminal
courts, Sas and Cunningham found that in about half the cases, the child
had been exposed to domestic violence 186 and that “overt threats were not
necessary [to deter immediate disclosure] if the man had a history of
violence within the home.” 187
If the perpetrator chooses a child outside his family, but nevertheless
under his influence, he can develop bonds that make him a father figure.
Those bonds often extend beyond the child to the child’s family. Hence,
the child looks up to the perpetrator and holds him in high esteem. The
child is deterred from reporting the abuse for fear of harming the perpetrator
or those in the child’s family who are close to the perpetrator. The child
also has reason to doubt that others will believe his report because they will
have difficulty believing the perpetrator is a child molester.
The gradual introduction of sexual acts will increase the likelihood that
the child feels complicit in the abuse and will thus feel guilt, shame, and
180

Id.
Marcus Choi Tye, Susan L. Amato, Charles R. Honts, Mary K. Devitt & Douglas
Peters, The Willingness of Children to Lie and the Assessment of Credibility in an
Ecologically Relevant Laboratory Setting, 3 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 92, 95–96 (1999).
182
Mark D. Everson et al., Maternal Support Following Disclosure of Incest, 59 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 197, 200 (1989) (“[M]others were significantly more supportive of their
children if the offender were an ex-spouse than if he were someone with whom the women
had a current relationship.”).
183
Louanne Lawson & Mark Chaffin, False Negatives in Sexual Abuse Disclosure
Interviews, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 532, 538 (1992) (finding that of the number of
children with clear medical evidence of sexual abuse, 63% of those whose parents were
willing to believe that their children might have been sexually abused disclosed whereas
only 17% of the children whose parents refused to accept this possibility disclosed).
184
Irit Hershkowitz et al., Exploring the Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse with Alleged
Victims and Their Parents, 31 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 111, 119 (2007).
185
Malloy et al., supra note 178, at 165.
186
SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 62 (finding that 46% of prosecution sample had been
exposed to domestic violence against mother by intimate partner).
187
Id. at 114. One child who denied being threatened answered: “No, but I knew what
he was capable of.” Id.
181
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embarrassment, further deterring disclosure. The more manipulative forms
of abuse are likely to increase children’s perceptions of self-blame. If the
child fails to resist, she is more likely to believe that she consented. If she
delays in reporting, she is more likely to believe that subsequent acts of
abuse were consensual, or at least that her failure to disclose is responsible
for their reoccurrence. The child may intuit these beliefs, and the
perpetrator is likely to encourage them explicitly both to minimize the
perpetrator’s own responsibility for the abuse and to help maintain secrecy.
In their sample of criminal cases, Sas and Cunningham found that
delay was more likely if the child experienced pre-abuse grooming and
“had been subjected to subtle and non-aggressive techniques to secure
compliance with the sexual act.” 188 Clinical studies also find that
manipulation is more likely than coercion to lead to a delay in disclosure. 189
Further, the younger the child, the more likely the self-blame, 190 and
children abused by someone within the family exhibit more self-blame than
children abused by someone outside the family. 191 Self-blame has been
found to delay disclosure. 192
When asked why they delayed disclosing or never disclosed, victims
report many of the factors discussed above. In Anderson’s population
survey:
When asked what had prevented disclosure, 65% of the victims gave these reasons:
expected to be blamed (29% of cases), embarrassment (25%), not wanting to upset
anyone (24%), expected disbelief (23%), not bothered by abuse (18%), wished to
protect the abuser (14%), fear of abuser (11%), and wanting to obey adults (3%). 193

In Fleming’s population survey:
When the women were asked what prevented disclosure, by far the most common
reason given was embarrassment or shame (47/80 [46%]), followed by the belief that

188

Id. at 24. Conversely, immediate disclosure was likely if “force was used to gain
compliance with the sexual act.” Id.
189
Hershkowitz, Delayed Disclosure, supra note 154, at 446. Sauzier did not analyze
percentages statistically, but it appeared that immediate disclosures were more common
when a perpetrator used force than when he used manipulation. Maria Sauzier, Disclosure of
Child Sexual Abuse: For Better or For Worse, 12 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 455, 466
(1989).
190
Ann Hazzard et al., Predicting Symptomatology and Self-Blame Among Child Sex
Abuse Victims 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 707, 711 (1995).
191
Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review
and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 164, 170 (1993); Jodi A.
Quas et al., Predictors of Attributions of Self-Blame and Internalizing Behavior Problems in
Sexually Abused Children, 44 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 723, 731 (2003).
192
Goodman-Brown et al., supra note 133, at 534 (showing that children who perceived
more responsibility took longer to disclose).
193
Anderson et al., supra note 132, at 915.
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the other person would not be able to help them (23/80 [23%]), or would somehow
blame or punish them for the abuse (19/80 [18%]). 194

And in Sas’s criminal sample:
In order of frequency, their responses were: fear of harm to self or others; fear of bad
consequences for self (e.g., rejection by parent); concern for family and to protect
them from disruption; fear of disbelief; never thought about telling;
embarrassment/stigma; concern for bad consequences for abuser; lack of someone
195
trusted to tell; and altruism—enduring abuse to protect other children from abuser.

D. OVERT THREATS
Notably, the discussion thus far has not assumed that perpetrators
overtly threaten their victims. A successful perpetrator does not need to
make any overt threats because the child will be sufficiently motivated to
keep the abuse a secret. Perhaps more than any other factor, this
distinguishes nondisclosure in sexual abuse cases from the classic forfeiture
situation, in which the perpetrator threatens the victim in order to enforce
secrecy.
The percentage of perpetrators who report specifically warning the
child not to tell varies widely across the studies. In Budin and Johnson’s
sample, 25% acknowledged threats not to disclose. 196 In Elliott and
colleagues’ study, 33% acknowledged telling the child not to tell.197 In
Lang and Frenzel’s study, 40% of extrafamilial perpetrators and 85% of
incest perpetrators acknowledged telling the child not to tell.198
Of course, these may be underestimates. Kaufman and colleagues
compared what child sex perpetrators admitted in interviews to what their
therapists recalled from perpetrators’ records (and prior admissions) and
found that the sex perpetrators consistently underreported their use of
threats to induce both compliance and secrecy. 199 However, victims in
criminal samples also report perpetrator threats to keep the abuse secret in

194

Fleming, supra note 132, at 69.
SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 27–28.
196
Budin & Johnson, supra note 143, at 80.
197
Elliott et al., supra note 139, at 592.
198
Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 311.
199
Keith Kaufman et al., Assessing Child Sexual Offenders’ Modus Operandi: Accuracy
in Self-Reported Use of Threats and Coercion, 6 ANNALS SEX RES. 213, 221 (1993).
195
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no more than half the cases (the percentages range from about 25% 200 to
50%). 201
When they do acknowledge discussing disclosure with the child,
perpetrators report a wide variety of inducements to secrecy. Perpetrators
often refer to serious consequences from disclosure. Sixty-one percent of
the perpetrators in Smallbone and Wortley told children that the
perpetrators would go to jail or get in trouble. 202 Forty-three percent of the
incest perpetrators in Lang and Frenzel threatened that the family would
split up. 203 Twenty-four percent of the perpetrators in Elliott and
colleagues’ study used anger and the threat of physical force.204
Oftentimes, however, the threats are much milder and simply refer to
the loss of the perpetrator’s love and attention. Kaufman and colleagues
reported that perpetrators most often endorsed strategies that involved
giving or withdrawing benefits for nondisclosure, such as giving children
special rewards or privileges, and telling children that the perpetrator (or
caretaker(s)) would no longer love them if they disclosed. 205 Similarly,
Smallbone and Wortley found that perpetrators endorsed giving children
special rewards or privileges (21%) and relied on children’s fears that they
would lose the perpetrators’ affection (36%). 206 In Elliott and colleagues’
study, 20% of perpetrators endorsed threatening the loss of love or stating
that the child was to blame. 207 Lang and Frenzel found that these sorts of
threats—expressing love for the child, giving the child special favors, and
avoiding punishing the child—were more common among incest
perpetrators than among extrafamilial perpetrators, perhaps because these
threats relied on the use of parental authority and control.208
Similar types of threats are reported by victims in the criminal
samples. Smith and colleagues found that:
[W]arnings ranged from pleas that the abuser would get into trouble if the child told
(or that the abuser would be sent away and the child would never see them again—a
200

GRAY, supra note 133, at 90 (“The victim was told by the perpetrator not to tell
anyone about the abuse, and threatened with consequences if she did tell, in almost 33% of
the cases.”); SMITH ET AL., A.B.A. FINAL REPORT, supra note 133, at 93 (“In over one fourth
(27%) of the cases, the defendant specifically warned the child not to tell about the sexual
abuse.”).
201
SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 26 (when children were asked about the first episode of
abuse, “in half the cases the abuser had warned them not to tell”).
202
SMALLBONE & WORTLEY, supra note 131, at 5.
203
Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 312 tbl.4.
204
Elliott et al., supra note 139, at 582.
205
Kaufman et al., supra note 143, at 355–56.
206
SMALLBONE & WORTLEY, supra note 131, at 5.
207
Elliott et al., supra note 139, at 582.
208
Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 311–12.
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powerful message to a young child whose abuser is also a “beloved” parent), to
threats that the child would be blamed for the abuse (especially troubling were
children who were told that the defendant’s intimate—the child’s mother—would
blame the child for “having sex” with the defendant and would thus turn against him
or her), to ominous warnings that the defendant would hurt or kill the child (or
209
someone he or she loved) if they revealed the abuse.

Although it might seem obvious that overt threats deter disclosure, the
evidence is actually mixed. In her large clinical sample, Hershkowitz found
that threats increased the likelihood that disclosure was delayed. 210 In their
criminal sample, Sas and Cunningham found that “threats were far more
common” among children who delayed reporting. 211 On the other hand,
two other criminal samples have not found clear evidence of the effect of
threats. Gray did not find a relation between threats and nondisclosure,
although she failed to look at delays, which is a more sensitive measure. 212
In another criminal sample, Goodman-Brown and colleagues found that fear
of harm to self or the perpetrator did not predict delays in disclosure,
although fear of harm to others did. 213
There are a number of reasons why threats may not always correlate
with nondisclosure. One problem is that researchers do not always
distinguish between threats to comply with the perpetrator’s sexual
demands and threats to keep the abuse a secret.214 Threats to comply
suggest abuse by force rather than seduction, which is less likely to
effectively silence a child. Second, as noted above, threats are only one of
many means by which perpetrators silence children, and it is likely that
perpetrators use threats less often when other forces are effective in
maintaining secrecy. Third, threats can only be documented based on
children’s reports (or perpetrators’ admissions), which may lead to
misestimation.
It is notable that the subtler methods of exploiting and inducing
compliance are more consistently found to deter or delay disclosure.
209

SMITH ET AL., A.B.A. FINAL REPORT, supra note 133, at 86; see also SAS ET EL., supra
note 133, at 91–92 (reporting threats to hurt the child or a third party, harm the mother
emotionally, or withdraw privileges, and warnings that the abuser would be harmed by the
disclosure or that the child would no longer be loved by the mother).
210
Hershkowitz, Delayed Disclosure, supra note 154, at 446.
211
SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 114.
212
GRAY, supra note 133, at 90–91.
213
Goodman-Brown et al., supra note 133, at 535. There are three reasons why the
study may have missed a relation between fears to self and delays. The researchers could
not question children directly, id. at 532, whether the child feared harm or not was measured
dichotomously, id., and delays were measured from the last act of abuse rather than the first,
id. at 529. Measuring delay from the last act of abuse underestimates the delay when abuse
is repeated.
214
London et al., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 130, at 202.
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Perpetrators who do not have to threaten their victims are most likely to
enjoy continued secrecy. The modus operandi of child molesters thus
demonstrates how a perpetrator both exploits and nurtures children’s
vulnerabilities. His purpose is to molest without the danger that the child
will disclose the abuse. This both ensures continued access to the child and
avoids discovery of the abuse. The efficacy of perpetrators’ methods is
demonstrated by the facts that most children do not disclose their abuse and
that the vast majority of abuse is never reported to authorities. The
perpetrator reasonably anticipates that the means by which he accomplishes
abuse ensures that the child will not speak out against him.
E. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS
Several concerns might be raised with our depiction of the dynamics of
child sexual abuse: (1) the data is tainted by false allegations; (2) children’s
reluctance to disclose abuse is exaggerated; and (3) the focus should be on
cases that are criminally prosecuted, not on sexual abuse generally. We will
address each of these concerns in turn.
1. False allegations
Studies in which victims are asked about their experiences are subject
to the concern that some of the allegations are false. In child sexual abuse
cases, the child’s statement is often the strongest evidence that abuse
occurred. However, the child may be lying, may have been coached, or
may have formed false beliefs due to adult suggestion. Several factors
minimize these concerns. First, interviews with admitted perpetrators
provide convergent evidence for the dynamics of sexual abuse. Second,
respondents who describe abuse in population surveys are not subject to the
sorts of pressures that might undermine child witnesses’ claims. As noted
above, population surveys consistently find that of those respondents who
claim to have been sexually abused as children, only about 10% state that
their abuse was ever reported to the authorities. 215 This reduces the
likelihood of false positives, because overzealous parents and investigative
authorities are the most commonly cited causes of false allegations.
Similarly, only about 2% report that their memory of abuse was elicited
with the support of a therapist, 216 another possible source of false reports.
Third, even if these samples contain some false allegations, it is not obvious
that this would undermine evidence that perpetrators are deliberately
215

See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
Sharon C. Wilsnack et al., Self-Reports of Forgetting and Remembering Childhood
Sexual Abuse in a Nationally Representative Sample of U.S. Women, 26 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 139, 144 (2002).
216
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exploitative. For this to be the case, false allegations would have to contain
more evidence of exploitation than true cases. This seems unlikely, if only
because false allegations are usually attributed to the unfounded suspicions
of lay persons, and lay conceptions of sexual abuse likely assume force.217
2. Reluctance
Some researchers have argued that children’s reluctance to disclose
sexual abuse is exaggerated. They primarily rely on the fact that in clinical
samples of children questioned about suspected sexual abuse, the disclosure
rate among children determined to be sexually abused is very high. 218 The
problem with this argument is that clinical samples contain an inordinate
number of victims who are uncommonly willing to disclose abuse. The
most common evidence of abuse is a disclosure. Because a disclosure is
what usually triggers suspicion of abuse and a report to the authorities, and
disclosure to an investigator is usually necessary to substantiate abuse,
disclosure rates are necessarily very high in substantiated abuse cases. 219
One solution is to identify children whose abuse could be identified
and substantiated without questioning the child.220 If abused children are
not reluctant to disclose, then those children should acknowledge being
abused when directly asked. Lyon reviewed several decades of research
examining disclosure rates among children with gonorrhea, most of whom
had been diagnosed before ever being questioned about sexual abuse. Less
than half of the children disclosed sexual abuse when first questioned. 221
Similarly low rates of disclosure have been found in the few studies
examining cases in which evidence of sexual abuse surfaced before the
child’s disclosure. 222
217
KENNETH V. LANNING, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 7 (5th ed. 2010),
available at www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC70.pdf (“For the public the
‘default setting’ still seems to be stranger abduction. To them child molesters are sick
perverts or ‘predators’ who physically overpower children and violently force them into
sexual activity.”).
218
Stephen J. Ceci, Sarah Kulkofsky, J. Zoe Klemfuss, Charlotte D. Sweeney & Maggie
Bruck, Unwarranted Assumptions about Children’s Testimonial Accuracy, 3 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 311, 322–23 (2007).
219
Lyon, False Denials, supra note 130, at 43–45.
220
An additional advantage of these studies is that the evidence reduces the likelihood
that the allegations are false.
221
Lyon, False Denials, supra note 130, at 48.
222
Lawson and Chaffin found that 57% of children with a sexually transmitted disease
failed to disclose abuse when questioned. Lawson & Chaffin, supra note 183, at 537.
Muram and his colleagues found that 49% of children with medical evidence strongly
indicative of sexual abuse failed to disclose. David Muram et al., Genital Abnormalities in
Female Siblings and Friends of Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
105, 108 tb1.2 (1991).
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Another solution to the problem with relying on clinical studies in
order to assess children’s reluctance to disclose is to resort to population
surveys. Unlike clinical samples, which enlist participants who already
self-identified as former victims, population surveys can identify former
victims who have never previously disclosed their abuse. As noted above,
substantial percentages of survey respondents who acknowledge childhood
abuse report having delayed disclosing or never having disclosed at all. 223
Skeptics argue that survey respondents’ nondisclosure was simply due
to the fact that they were never asked. 224 This may be true, though whether
they were ever asked is unknown. Regardless, the surveys provide other
evidence of reluctance. First, substantiated abuse is often subsequently
denied by survey respondents. 225 Second, more persistent questioning
elicits more reports of abuse. 226 Third, respondents surveyed repeatedly are
often inconsistent in acknowledging that abuse occurred. 227
223

Surveys may also understate reluctance to disclose to the extent that survey
respondents are reluctant to tell the surveyor that they were victimized. If reluctant children
who fail to report true abuse grow up to be reluctant adults, then the adults who acknowledge
abuse in surveys are disproportionately those who acknowledged abuse as children, and
former victims who deny abuse in surveys are disproportionately those who never disclosed
as children. Calculating nondisclosure based on the adults who acknowledge abuse may
therefore underestimate childhood reluctance.
224
Ceci et al., supra note 218, at 322.
225
See Jochen Hardt & Michael Rutter, Validity of Adult Retrospective Reports of
Adverse Childhood Experiences: Review of the Evidence, 45 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHIATRY 260, 270 (2004). Hardt and Rutter concluded that “the universal finding [is]
that, even with well-documented serious abuse or neglect, about a third of individuals do not
report its occurrence when specifically asked about it in adult life.” Id. at 270.
226
See Rebecca M. Bolen & Maria Scannapieco, Prevalence of Child Sexual Abuse: A
Corrective Metanalysis, 73 SOC. SERV. REV. 281, 293 (1999); Wilsnack et al., supra note
216, at 143 (finding that the percentage of respondents reporting abuse doubled (from 15%
to 31%) when they asked a greater number of specific questions about sexually abusive
experiences).
227
Richard P.W. Fry et al., Interviewing for Sexual Abuse: Reliability and Effect of
Interviewer Gender, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 725, 727 (1996). Fry and colleagues
interviewed female gynecological clinic patients complaining of chronic pelvic pain at two
time periods, three months apart. The authors found that 26% of the abuse mentioned at the
first interview was not mentioned at the second interview (41/155) and that 16% of the abuse
mentioned at the second interview was not mentioned at the first interview (22/136).
Although one might suspect that women omitted abuse that was relatively trivial and
therefore less memorable, the authors found that the “effect is even more striking when the
reports of severe (contact) abuse are examined.” Id. at 727. In their study, Robin McGee
and her colleagues questioned adolescents from the open caseload of a child-protection
agency who were substantiated as sexually abused and found that 19% (12/63) denied sexual
abuse when individually questioned by two researchers. Robin McGee et al., The
Measurement of Maltreatment: A Comparison of Approaches, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
233, 239–40 (1995). In their population survey of eighteen-year-olds, Fergusson and
colleagues found relatively low prevalence rates of abuse compared to other surveys and
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3. Criminal cases vs. sexual abuse generally
One might argue that since we are crafting a rule to apply in criminal
cases, we ought to focus exclusively on criminal samples. However, if the
goal is to identify what is reasonably foreseeable from the perpetrator’s
perspective when he abuses a child, one needs to understand abuse in
general. As one moves from clinical samples to criminal court samples, the
children become less representative of abused children in general. In a
number of jurisdictions, most substantiated cases of sexual abuse are never
referred for prosecution. 228 If one focuses on prosecution samples, one
understates the difficulties that child victims have in coming forward.
Prosecutors reject the cases that are most fit for forfeiture treatment.
Prosecutors are less likely to file charges when the child is young, exhibits
reluctance or inconsistency in reporting, and the family is unsupportive. 229
Cases are more often dismissed when the child is young and the abuse
occurs within the family. 230 As a result, cases that go to trial typically
involve children who successfully take the stand and maintain their
allegations. 231
Nevertheless, testifying still constitutes a major hurdle for child
witnesses. In their study of criminal trials, Goodman and colleagues found
that children’s greatest fear was of seeing the defendant in court. 232 In a lab
study, Goodman and colleagues conducted a mock trial in which four- to
eight-year-olds were asked to testify. Despite their efforts to make the
recognized the danger that their young respondents were not ready to disclose. David M.
Fergusson, Michael T. Lynskey & L. John Horwood, Childhood Sexual Abuse and
Psychiatric Disorder in Young Adulthood: I. Prevalence of Sexual Abuse and Factors
Associated with Sexual Abuse, 35 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1355,
1361 (1996). Three years later, Fergusson and colleagues questioned the same individuals
when they were twenty-one. Fergusson et al., Stability of Child Abuse Reports, supra note
132, at 534. Remarkably, among the respondents who reported sexual abuse at twenty-one,
45% had failed to report abuse at eighteen (37/83). Id. Conversely, among the respondents
who reported sexual abuse at eighteen years of age, more than half (54%) failed to report
abuse at age twenty-one (54/100). Id.
228
Theodore P. Cross, Wendy A. Walsh, Monique Simone & Lisa M. Jones, Prosecution
of Child Abuse: A Meta-Analysis of Rates of Criminal Justice Decisions, 4 TRAUMA
VIOLENCE & ABUSE 323, 330 (2003) (finding that special programs had higher referral rates,
but standard child-protection samples referred 40% of substantiated cases to the
prosecution).
229
GRAY, supra note 133, at 94–96.
230
Id. at 111, 114.
231
See Kathleen Coulborn Faller & James Henry, Child Sexual Abuse: A Case Study in
Community Collaboration, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1215, 1223 (2000); Gail S.
Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault
Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS SOC. RES. CHILD DEV. 1, 80 (1992) [hereinafter Testifying in
Criminal Court].
232
Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court, supra note 231, at v.
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experiment as comfortable as possible for the children, 25% of the children
“refused to testify, either by outright refusal or by appearing distressed so
that the RA judged that the child should not continue.” 233
In sum, even if almost all children who entered the court process
managed to testify, this would not undercut the argument that a perpetrator
can reasonably foresee a victim’s unavailability in cases in which he has
selected, groomed, and admonished his victim to keep silent. The children
for whom charges are filed are the tip of the iceberg. When a child
ultimately refuses to take the stand, this only surprises those whose
experience is limited to the cases that come to trial.
V. FORFEITURE BY EXPLOITATION IN THE COURTS
The Supreme Court has shown some appreciation of the dynamics of
abuse. The Court has noted that “a child’s feelings of vulnerability and
guilt and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly acute
when the abuser is a parent.” 234 Citing some of the research reviewed here,
the Court has found that “[u]nderreporting is a common problem with
respect to child sexual abuse. . . . [O]ne of the most commonly cited
reasons for nondisclosure is fear of negative consequences for the
perpetrator, a concern that has special force where the abuser is a family
member . . . .” 235
The lower courts have sometimes been amenable to the arguments
underlying forfeiture by exploitation, but have trod carefully because of
continuing uncertainties over the scope of the forfeiture doctrine. The
typical case of forfeiture by wrongdoing involves ham-fisted silencing of
witnesses through murder and overt threats of violence.236 These cases
233

Gail S. Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit
Technology on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions, 22 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 165, 179 (1998). The authors note the difficulty of ensuring that a large number of
children would be willing to testify:
Such pilot testing revealed the necessity of employing staff who could establish rapport quickly
and well with children, the chance for children to tour the courtroom and answer questions on the
witness stand before being asked to testify, the opportunity for children to meet and have a
friendly exchange with the prosecutor and judge before the trial, a chance for children to adjust
to the courtroom and answer simple questions posed by the judge before the jury entered, and
maintenance of an emotionally supportive atmosphere by the judge and attorneys toward the
children. The critical importance of the children’s parents staying in the courtroom when the
children testified also became apparent, a privilege often denied actual child witnesses.

Id. at 177–78.
234
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
235
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 444 (2008) (citations omitted).
236
See, e.g., Hodges v. Florida, 506 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Stewart,
485 F.3d 666 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Rivera, 412 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950 (7th
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raise only a few of the issues that arise in child abuse prosecutions. Most of
the cases cited above in which appellate courts reversed convictions due to
the admission of testimonial hearsay from unavailable child witnesses did
not even consider the issue of forfeiture.
A notable exception is State v. Waddell, the case discussed in the
Introduction. The reader will recall that seven-year-old J.M.J. accused
Waddell, her next-door neighbor, of intercourse, sodomy, and other sexual
acts. The state anticipated the girl’s difficulty in testifying, and did what it
could to either present her at trial or lay the groundwork for admission of
her videotaped interview. Before trial, the state had filed “several motions
designed to provide a careful structure for her courtroom appearance.” 237
Shortly before the trial, a psychotherapist who spoke to J.M.J. observed that
she “tried to avoid talking about the abuse,” but was willing to draw a
picture depicting genital touching. 238
The state then made a motion to find J.M.J. unavailable to testify,
which was denied. 239 “During the hearing on her availability . . . J.M.J. told
defense counsel that she was scared, but said she was not afraid that anyone
in the room would do anything to her. She stated she remembered what
happened, but she did not want to talk about it.”240 As a result, “J.M.J. was
required to appear at trial, but refused to talk about the events involving
Waddell.” 241
The appellate court found that the facts of the case did not justify a
forfeiture finding. It emphasized that “in forfeiture cases involving threats
or coercion, the threats or coercion occurred after the events giving rise to
the criminal charges,” and noted that “there was no evidence Waddell had
any contact with J.M.J. after his detention.” 242 The arbitrary temporal
limitation prevented the court from considering the ways in which Waddell
had exploited the child.
Had the court felt comfortable assessing the relationship between the
defendant and J.M.J. and the means by which he accomplished the abuse, it
could have reached a different conclusion regarding her failure at the
Cir. 2002); United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Emery,
186 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271 (1st Cir. 1996);
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. White, 838 F.
Supp. 618 (D.D.C. 1993); Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d 165 (D.C. 1997); State v.
Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2006).
237
State v. Waddell, No. 92,378, 2006 WL 1379576, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. May 19,
2006).
238
Id. at *3.
239
Id. at *5, *9.
240
Id. at *9.
241
Id. at *5.
242
Id. at *9.
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availability hearing to testify to her fears and her ultimate refusal to testify.
As the reader will recall, Waddell was J.M.J.’s next-door neighbor, and
J.M.J. “played frequently in Waddell’s yard and with his pets. She also
occasionally went inside Waddell’s trailer.” 243 According to Waddell, she
would come into his trailer unannounced, they had watched television
together, and she had used his bathroom. 244 He testified that J.M.J had been
mad at him for failing to get her a Christmas present and for not buying her
a new pet turtle when her old turtle died.245 J.M.J. was also acquainted with
his daughter and granddaughter, and she visited them at his trailer (while he
was in jail awaiting trial). 246 When J.M.J. first disclosed Waddell’s abuse
to her grandmother, she said, “‘I still want to play with the puppies, but
Kenny touched me in my privates.’” 247 She also told two other adults that
she had not told because she wanted to continue seeing the puppies. 248
In subsequent interviews, J.M.J. described more serious worries.
According to the daycare provider, J.M.J. said that “Waddell put a knife to
her forehead or throat and threatened to kill her if she told anyone or did not
come back.” 249 In the videotaped interview:
J.M.J. stated that the first time Waddell touched her, it continued until she slapped
him and pulled his hands off; then she ran to her grandmother’s house. J.M.J.
described an incident where Waddell had a knife in his hand and said he would kill
her unless she stayed . . . . J.M.J. said several times that she screamed loudly. After
the touchings, Waddell let J.M.J. get dressed and run home. Later in the interview,
J.M.J. said she had been outside playing with Waddell’s dogs when he grabbed her
and forced her inside the house to commit these acts. She screamed. He also grabbed
her when she took over Girl Scout cookies. When asked whether Waddell touched
her with the knife in his hand, J.M.J. said, “No.” At the conclusion of the interview,
however, J.M.J. spontaneously said Waddell had two knives in one hand and held
250
them to her face. J.M.J. said Waddell would kill her if she did not stay with him.

According to J.M.J.’s grandmother, after J.M.J.’s initial disclosure, she
did not want to go outside because “‘[s]he was afraid he might be outside
and know she told.’ J.M.J. did not want to even see Waddell’s trailer, so
[her grandmother] covered up the windows on that side of her house.” 251
J.M.J.’s fears were no less relevant to a forfeiture determination
because they were attributable to actions taken by the defendant during the
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251

Id. at *1.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1, *3 (school counselor and daycare provider).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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course of repeated abuse. Waddell’s exploitation of the child was as
deliberate and as wrongful as any defendant’s actions taken to silence a
witness after a crime has been committed. Although many of Waddell’s
actions were described by the child as violent and forceful, she originally
described her desire to play with his puppies as the primary reason for her
delayed disclosure. Hence, the evidence suggests Waddell utilized a
combination of positive and coercive inducements in order to continue the
abusive relationship.
On the other hand, not all sexual abuse should be subject to a forfeiture
claim. The question is whether the perpetrator took advantage of and
nurtured the child’s frailties in order to successfully commit (and recommit)
the crime. We have emphasized the factors that perpetrators use to exploit
children and effectively delay reporting: (1) a familial or otherwise close
relationship between the perpetrator and the child and (2) grooming
behavior by the perpetrator, which includes befriending the child,
desensitizing the child to touch, using bribes and threats in order to induce
compliance with sexual acts, and admonishing the child not to disclose. The
efficacy of the defendant’s exploitation is evinced by nondisclosure, delays
in disclosure, and inconsistencies in willingness to disclose over time.
Many of these elements were missing in In re Rolandis G., a case in
which the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a forfeiture claim. In that case,
the perpetrator was an eleven-year-old neighborhood boy who allegedly
“forced [Von, a six-year-old boy] into a nearby wooded area and threatened
him with a stick if he did not do what Rolandis wanted.” 252 Rolandis made
Von “pinky swear” not to tell anyone about the abuse. 253 Within minutes of
coming home from the assault by Rolandis, and ignoring Rolandis’s pleas
to come back outside, Von disclosed the abuse to his mother. 254 True, Von
told his mother that because of the pinky swear, he “did not want her to tell
anyone else what Rolandis had done.” 255 But within ten minutes a police
officer arrived, and Von disclosed to him as well. 256 Even armed with an
understanding of the dynamics of abuse, a court could reasonably conclude
that there was limited evidence that the way in which Rolandis chose his
victim and accomplished the abuse effectively silenced the boy.
The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that “sexual abusers
sometimes select children as their victims because children are generally
more vulnerable to threats and coercion due to their age and immaturity.” 257
252
253
254
255
256
257

In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 602 (Ill. 2008).
Id. at 604.
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 604.
Id.
Id. at 616. The Colorado Supreme Court has also noted (in a post-Giles case) that

1224

THOMAS D. LYON & JULIA A. DENTE

[Vol. 102

However, the court then rejected forfeiture on the grounds that “there is no
indication that when respondent sexually assaulted Von, his assault was
motivated in any way by a desire to prevent Von from bearing witness
against him at trial.” 258 The reach of the court’s language is unclear. It is
certainly reasonable to doubt that the eleven-year-old who wields a stick
chooses and grooms his sexual abuse victims. But if the court assumed that
sexual motivation for the act undermined forfeiture, then it misread Giles.
The fact that Giles was a jealous ex-lover did not mean he could not intend
to silence his victim; such mixed motives did not defeat the forfeiture claim.
Moreover, in child sexual abuse cases, the question is not whether the
perpetrator abused the child in order to silence him. The question is
whether the perpetrator’s modus operandi was designed to maintain the
child’s cooperation and silence.
With respect to the pinky swear, the Illinois Supreme Court held “there
is nothing in the record to indicate that when respondent extracted the
promise from Von, he did so in contemplation of some future trial.” 259
Again, the reach of the court’s statement is unclear. Perhaps it was
implying that an eleven-year-old fears only detection, but never imagines
being prosecuted. If this is so, then it is reasonable to refuse to apply
forfeiture. But surely defendants’ threats can be aimed at deterring any
disclosure, above and beyond disclosures that lead to legal liability, and still
provide evidence of forfeiture. Significantly, Giles referred to the
defendant’s potential efforts to deter the victim from “resorting to outside
help.” 260 The defendant hoped that the victim would not report his abuse to
anyone; thus, it would be odd to hold that his actions were not intended to
deter reporting to the police.
Perhaps the most significant fact about In re Rolandis G. is that the
child disclosed abuse to a police officer shortly after the first and only
assault. The relation between threats and unavailability may be undermined
by intervening testimonial statements. This consideration may explain the
New York Court of Appeal’s uncertainty about forfeiture in People v.
Johnson. 261 In Johnson, the defendant was a fifty-two-year-old pastor
convicted of intercourse and sodomy with a twelve-year-old girl, one of his
parishioners. The abuse was discovered when the mother found sexually
“the manner in which [the defendant] chose his victim” is a valid consideration in forfeiture;
however, in the case before it, the prosecution did not introduce any evidence of intent,
solely arguing that the fact of abuse and the fact that the child was traumatized were
sufficient. People v. Moreno, 160 P.3d 242, 247 (Colo. 2007).
258
Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 616.
259
Id.
260
Giles v. California, 544 U.S. 353, 354 (2008).
261
See People v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 967 (N.Y. 1999).
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explicit letters from the girl to the defendant. At her mother’s urging, the
child placed a pretextual call to the defendant that was recorded by the
police. The child also testified about the abuse before the grand jury, but
“[w]hen called at trial . . . she had ‘nothing to say’ and otherwise refused to
testify.” 262 In the recorded conversation, the defendant asked the child to
“lie so that he would not ‘go to jail.’” 263 The court acknowledged that his
statements could “support an inference of domination or improper
influence, providing the requisite link to the girl’s eventual refusal to testify
at trial.” 264 However, mentioning the fact that the child had both reported
the abuse to the police and testified before a grand jury, the court ordered a
hearing so that the “defendant would have . . . an opportunity to challenge
the People’s evidence by raising questions as to defendant’s role in securing
the victim’s unavailability at trial.” 265 Hence, the court implied that the
child’s testimonial statements, which included formal testimony, cast doubt
on the causal connection between the defendant’s actions and the child’s
refusal to testify at trial. Of course, the child’s willingness to testify before
the grand jury (at which the defendant could not be present) does not
preclude a finding that her unwillingness to testify at trial (at which the
defendant had a right to be present) was attributed to the defendant’s
actions. Nevertheless, whether and when the child disclosed to authorities
are certainly relevant factors to the court’s assessment.
Commentators have gone so far as to claim that any disclosure of the
abuse breaks the causal link between predisclosure threats and the victim’s
failure to testify. 266 However, if there is a close relationship between the
defendant and the victim, the abuse continues over time, and the child
delays reporting, then the victim’s ultimate failure to testify can fairly be
attributed to the defendant. The efficacy of the defendant’s actions is
demonstrated by the delays in reporting. The child’s disclosure likely
reflects a fragile resolve; the same factors that increase delays in reporting
increase the likelihood that the child’s report will be inconsistent over time.
Recantations are more likely when the perpetrator is closer to the child and
262

Id. at 968.
Id. at 969.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
Fishman, supra note 83, at 298 (“[T]he defense can argue that, even assuming the
defendant had threatened or cajoled the child not to report the abuse, ultimately the child did
report it, or there would be no case to prosecute. Thus, those threats or blandishments, in the
end, were ineffective, and therefore could not have ‘procured’ the child’s subsequent
inability to testify.”); Mosteller, supra note 113, at 695 n.77 (acknowledging that defendants
can argue that “forfeiture is illogical because the child was obviously not intimidated from
reporting by the perpetrator’s threat . . . [and thus] there is no reason to believe the victim
failed to testify because of that ineffectual threat”).
263
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the child is younger. 267 Furthermore, although legal doctrine since
Crawford treats a child’s testimonial hearsay as equivalent to testimony,
this formal equivalence says nothing about the psychological difference
between disclosing abuse to a police officer in an interviewing room and
testifying to abuse in an open courtroom in front of the defendant.
In assessing whether pretrial disclosures should affect the forfeiture
inquiry, it is useful to consider the different perspectives of adults and
children. When adults report crimes in the face of threats, they probably
understand that reporting to the police can ultimately lead to testifying in
court against the defendant. If they are unwilling to testify, they will simply
fail to report or refuse to cooperate with the police. Hence, the fact that an
adult reports a crime to police may weigh against finding a causal
connection between the defendant’s prior threats and the declarant’s
unavailability at trial.
Even if she does cooperate, an adult’s continuing fears of testifying
may support a forfeiture claim. In Ware v. Harry, 268 a post-Giles case, an
eyewitness who described the crime and named the defendant spoke several
times with the police. However, the police officers who interviewed the
witness reported that she was “visibly frightened,” and she repeatedly told
them that she was afraid to testify. 269 The court found forfeiture on the
basis of threats that were made at the time of the crime. 270
Children have a less sophisticated understanding of the legal process,
such that cooperation with the police is only weak evidence that they
anticipate testifying. They are unlikely to recognize that by talking to the
police, they are initiating a process that will not be complete unless they are
capable of taking the stand and testifying against the defendant in the
defendant’s presence.
Children’s limited understanding of the legal process has led some to
argue that children’s statements to the police should not be classified as
testimonial. 271 However, we believe this goes too far. It is likely that even
young children understand the role of the police in arresting and
incarcerating criminals; they know that the police put people in jail.
267

Malloy et al., supra note 178, at 165.
Ware v. Harry, 636 F. Supp. 2d 574 (E.D. Mich. 2008), objections overruled by Ware
v. Harry, No. 06-CV-10553-DT, 2008 WL 4852972 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2008).
269
Id. at 586.
270
Id. (explaining that defendant “had threatened those who had witnessed the killing
with death if they talked about the incident. Specifically, petitioner told the witnesses ‘if it
gets out I know who to go to’ and ‘I know everybody in this house right now . . . [i]f this shit
go any further y’all next.’”).
271
Victor I. Vieth, Keeping the Balance True: Admitting Child Hearsay in the Wake of
Crawford v. Washington, 16 APRI UPDATE No. 12 (Am. Prosecutors Research Inst.,
Alexandria, V.A.), 2004, at 1–2.
268
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Researchers have demonstrated that children exhibit an early appreciation
of the power of the police. Lyon and colleagues found that even the
youngest children they tested (four-year-olds) distinguished between
reporting transgressions to the police and to teachers, and by six, children
distinguished between reporting transgressions to the police and to parents
(preferring parents as recipients). 272 Moore and colleagues found that “after
the President, kindergartners view the policeman as the next most
influential governmental figure.” 273
What children probably fail to comprehend is the complicated process
by which an arrest leads to conviction. It is because they do not understand
the judicial process that young children are likely to believe that the police
can summarily throw criminals in jail. Therefore, children’s statements to
the police could be considered testimonial, at the same time that their
willingness to talk to the police says little about their willingness to
testify. 274
In sum, when adults make testimonial statements, their willingness to
do so is evidence that they are willing to cooperate with the prosecution,
and that prior threats have not deterred them from coming forward. Of
course, it is not conclusive evidence, but it helps to explain why courts
would look for evidence that the defendant engaged in wrongdoing after the
declarant’s initial disclosure. The fact that a young child has reported abuse
to the police is much weaker evidence that threats have been ineffective.
Rather, the efficacy of the defendant’s actions in silencing the child can be
demonstrated through delays and inconsistencies in the child’s report.
VI. CONCLUSION
The dynamics of child abuse reveal how abusers exploit their victims’
vulnerabilities, making it unlikely that the victims will ever take the stand.
Abusers silence children, and then complain when children are unable to
speak out at trial. Our proposal takes into account the dynamics of child
abuse and the vulnerability of child abuse victims, and it offers an approach
that is both fair and consistent with Supreme Court doctrine.
272

Lyon et al., Disclosing Adult Transgressions, supra note 179, at 1721.
STANLEY W. MOORE ET AL., THE CHILD’S POLITICAL WORLD: A LONGITUDINAL
PERSPECTIVE 52 (1985).
274
With respect to the classification of their statements as testimonial, children are
probably less familiar with the role that non-law-enforcement personnel play in the process.
Hence, unless they are informed of police involvement, they may not understand that their
statements to child advocacy center interviewers, medical personnel, and social workers are
functionally equivalent to statements to the police. For this reason, there is still room to
argue that if one adopts solely the declarant’s perspective, children’s complaints of abuse are
often nontestimonial.
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A. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL ON PROSECUTION
Adopting these views of forfeiture will not make it easy to prosecute
child sexual abuse. Jurors intuit the frailties of child witnesses that
researchers have emphasized: younger children have weaker memories and
are more likely to be suggestible. 275 Jurors expect to see medical evidence
of sexual abuse, 276 but even penile-vaginal penetration and sodomy usually
do not leave physical signs. 277 Even when there is medical evidence, it
rarely points to a specific perpetrator, making the child’s identification
essential. 278 If the child discloses abuse with little emotion, which is
typical, the jurors will be skeptical, expecting to see tears.279 And if the
child reports that she didn’t resist, which is also typical, the jurors are less
likely to convict.280 If the child is twelve or older, male jurors will see
consent as a good defense, and if they are told not to consider consent, they
are even more likely to do so. 281
Our proposal will not lead to a flood of child abuse prosecutions
without the victim. Prosecutors believe that jurors want to see the child in
court, 282 an intuition that is supported by research suggesting that jurors are
more inclined to believe child witnesses when they see them in person.283
There is no evidence that prior to Crawford, prosecutors routinely went to
275
Jody A. Quas et al., Do Jurors “Know” What Isn’t So About Child Witnesses?, 29 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 425, 448 (2005).
276
Susan Morison & Edith Greene, Juror and Expert Knowledge of Child Sexual Abuse,
16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 595, 608 (1992).
277
Astrid Heger et al., Children Referred for Possible Sexual Abuse: Medical Findings in
2384 Children, 26 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 645, 652 (2002).
278
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 824 (1990) (“Corroboration of a child’s allegations of
sexual abuse by medical evidence of abuse, for example, sheds no light on the reliability of
the child’s allegations regarding the identity of the abuser.”).
279
Pamela C. Regan & Sheri J. Baker, The Impact of Child Witness Demeanor on
Perceived Credibility and Trial Outcome in Sexual Abuse Cases, 13 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 187,
189, 192 (1998); Barbara Wood et al., Semistructured Child Sexual Abuse Interviews:
Interview and Child Characteristics Related to Credibility of Disclosure, 20 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 81, 88 (1996).
280
Thomas D. Lyon, Felony Charges of Child Sexual Abuse in Los Angeles County,
1997–2001 (2012) (unpublished data) (on file with the author).
281
Peter K. Isquith et al., Blaming the Child: Attribution of Responsibility to Victims of
Child Sexual Abuse, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING & IMPROVING
TESTIMONY 203, 223 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993).
282
John E.B. Myers et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases,
5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 388, 411 (1999) (“[P]rosecutors are reluctant to take child
sexual abuse cases to trial unless the victim is available to testify.”).
283
Goodman et al., Innovations for Child Witnesses, supra note 19, at 261 (“[A]cross
studies, when innovations do affect case outcome, either directly or indirectly, the effects
appear to be mainly in terms of innovation use being associated with fewer rather than more
guilty outcomes.”).
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trial without putting the child witness on the stand. Evans and Lyon
examined five years of felony sexual abuse cases tried in Los Angeles
County before Crawford and found that prosecutors relied on child hearsay
only 3% of the time. 284 Rather, our proposal makes it possible to proceed in
the relatively rare cases in which there is a substantial amount of
corroborative evidence, but the child’s statements are necessary to convince
a jury beyond any reasonable doubt.
B. EXPANDING THE ANALYSIS TO OTHER TYPES OF CASES
When children testify in court, it is most often in sexual abuse cases.
However, child witnesses also appear in physical abuse and domestic
violence cases. In a number of cases post-Crawford, appellate courts
reversed murder convictions in cases where children were the only
witnesses to murders. In Bell v. State, 285 a woman’s daughters (ages four
and five) saw her killed. The younger daughter told police officers that Bell
(her father) “asked [her mother] for money” and that her mother “emptied
her purse out on the floor.” 286 She then told the officers that “Bell pushed
[her mother] down over a table, broke the table . . . broke a mirror in [the]
bathroom . . . [and] used a small knife to put ‘blood on [her mother’s]
back.’” 287 The child’s statements were corroborated by the physical
evidence—police found an overturned coffee table, a purse with its contents
emptied, a broken mirror in the bathroom, and multiple knife wounds in the
mother’s body. 288 Both girls were found unavailable after they were unable
to endure a mock pretrial practice session.289 The conviction was reversed
because the statements were testimonial.290
In State v. Siler, a three-year-old reported witnessing his father beat
and then hang his mother in their garage. 291 In response to questioning by a
police detective, the child stated that his mother was “sleeping standing” in
the garage. 292 The child told how “Daddy, mommy fighting” in the garage
had scared him. 293 When asked “if anyone was hurting mommy,” he

284

Evans & Lyon, supra note 134, at 197 (finding that hearsay was admitted in lieu of
children’s testimony in 6 of 235 cases).
285
Bell v. State, 928 So.2d 951 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
286
Id. at 953.
287
Id.
288
Id. at 954.
289
See id. at 956.
290
Id. at 960–61.
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State v. Siler, 876 N.E.2d 534, 536–37 (Ohio 2007).
292
Id. at 536.
293
Id. at 537.
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responded, “Daddy did.” 294 Although officers prevented the child from
seeing his mother’s body, the child informed the detective that “the yellow
thing” had held his mother upright in the garage. 295 A yellow cord had been
tied around his mother’s neck. 296 When “asked who put the yellow thing on
her, the child responded, ‘Daddy.’” 297 The prosecution also presented
evidence of threats the father made against the mother and of past incidents
of domestic violence. 298 The conviction was reversed because the child’s
out-of-court statements were testimonial. 299
In Flores v. State, the defendant’s five-year-old daughter told her
foster mother and police that after her stepsister “peed on her [own] pants,”
her mother hit her and “she never woke up.” 300 The child refused to testify
against her mother and the trial court admitted her hearsay after assessing
its reliability. 301 The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the murder
conviction on the ground that the child’s statements to police were
testimonial hearsay. 302
These cases suggest that Crawford has affected the prosecution of
child physical abuse and domestic violence when children were the key
witnesses. Prosecution of child physical abuse is often facilitated by
documented physical injury, and thus may be easier than prosecuting sexual
abuse, in which medical evidence is uncommon. However, the perpetrator
must be identified, and the injuries must be proven to be intentional.
Because of the privacy afforded people in their homes, the only potential
witnesses are often family members. If the father is accused, then the
defense is likely to be that the mother was to blame, and vice versa.
Prosecution of domestic violence is notoriously difficult because the adult
victims—typically mothers—are themselves often (if not usually)
uncooperative. 303 If the mother refuses to cooperate, it is likely that the
child will be similarly unavailable.
The dynamics of child physical abuse and domestic violence are sure
to parallel what we have documented here regarding child sexual abuse.
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Virtually all child physical abuse allegations involve parents. 304 Domestic
violence by definition involves assaults by family members. Spouse
batterers frequently seek to control their victims, and violence is just one
means by which they foster dependency. 305 When domestic violence
occurs, there is a high likelihood that child physical abuse is also
occurring. 306 Underreporting of domestic violence by adults is legion.
Children’s underreporting of physical abuse is comparable to that of sexual
abuse. 307 Future work can explore the extent to which the dynamics of
physical abuse and domestic violence offer similar explanations for child
witnesses’ unavailability in these cases.308
C. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL ON CHILD INTERVIEWING
The proposed elements of a forfeiture finding encourage a more
complete interview with the child. The interviewer should explore the preabuse relationship between the perpetrator and the child; the progression of
abuse over time; the child’s feelings about the abuse and its aftermath; any
threats, bribes, or other inducements used by the perpetrator; and the child’s
disclosure history. All of these facts are relevant to the determination of
whether the defendant exploited the child’s foreseeable unavailability.
Our proposal encourages careful documentation of children’s reports
soon after the child’s first statements about abuse. As we have discussed,
many of the cases in which child abuse convictions were overturned
because of Crawford involved videotaped interviews that had been assessed
for their reliability pursuant to special hearsay exceptions for children’s
complaints of abuse. By expanding defendants’ confrontation rights such
304

Hershkowitz, Delayed Disclosure, supra note 154, at 448 (finding that 95% of
physical abuse is inflicted by parents).
305
See, e.g., Evan Stark, Commentary on Johnson’s “Conflict and Control: Gender
Symmetry and Asymmetry in Domestic Violence,” 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1019,
1021 (2006).
306
See Anne E. Appel & George W. Holden, The Co-Occurrence of Spouse and Physical
Child Abuse: A Review and Appraisal, 12 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 578, 586 (finding a 40% rate of
physical abuse in families in which spousal battering occurs).
307
Hershkowitz, Delayed Disclosure, supra note 154, at 444 (finding a lower rate of
disclosure in physical abuse); Irit Hershkowitz & Aline Elul, The Effects of Investigative
Utterances on Israeli Children’s Reports of Physical Abuse, 3 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 28, 32
(1999) (finding greater reluctance to disclose).
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Cf. Myrna Raeder, Thoughts about Giles and Forfeiture in Domestic Violence Cases,
75 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1347 (2010) (arguing that the rules of evidence enable the judge to
consider character evidence concerning defendant’s abusive personality when assessing a
forfeiture claim); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture after Giles: The Relevance of “Domestic
Violence Context,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. Rev. 711, 724–26 (2009) (discussing the dynamics
of domestic violence, including theories of how batterers control their victims, and how it
should affect forfeiture-by-wrongdoing findings).
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that testimonial hearsay is always disallowed, the Court has discouraged the
videotaping of formal interviews that benefit from the input and
cooperation of all potential players, including social services and law
enforcement. Hearsay is more likely to be classified as testimonial if it is
carefully documented, if it is in response to structured questioning, and if it
is conducted by agents of the government. However, all of these are
elements of a state-of-the-art forensic interview and enhance both reliability
and the ability to assess reliability. 309 Videotaping enables viewers to
assess the exact words used by the interviewer and by the child, whereas
notes or verbal reports are sure to be less complete and less accurate.310
When an interview is conducted well, the videotape will reveal appropriate
instructions and rapport building, the use of open-ended questions,
noncontingent encouragement, and the child’s free narrative of the alleged
event. When an interview is conducted poorly, the videotape will reveal the
interviewer’s bias, coercion, and suggestiveness on the one hand, and the
child’s confusion, acquiescence, and misinterpretation on the other.
Videotaping also facilitates a reduction in repeated interviewing, 311
because the interview can be shared by the different agencies (and the
different players within the agencies) involved in the child’s case, including
social services, the police, and attorneys in dependency court, family court,
and criminal court. Repeated interviewing increases the risk that the child’s
story will be distorted by suggestions and confabulation that become
incorporated in the child’s narrative, making the child’s trial testimony a
pale comparison to the original report.
In sum, our proposal accepts the proposition that defendants have a
right to confront declarants whose words are gathered in anticipation of
prosecution. At the same time, it recognizes the reality of child abuse:
defendants subvert justice not only through overt threats and violent acts,
but also through exploitation and manipulation of our most vulnerable
citizens. When exploitation ensures that a child victim will not testify, a
finding that the defendant has forfeited his confrontation rights is a fair
means to let the child be heard.
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